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EXORCISING THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE
Christine P. Bartholomew*
This Article debunks the empirical assumption behind the clergy
privilege, the evidentiary rule shielding confidential communications
with clergy. For over a century, scholars and the judiciary have
assumed generous protection is essential to foster and encourage
spiritual relationships. Accepting this premise, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have adopted virtually absolute privilege
statutes. To test this assumption, this Article distills data from over
700 decisions—making it the first scholarship to analyze state clergy
privilege jurisprudence exhaustively. This review finds a privilege in
decline; courts have lost faith in the privilege. More surprisingly,
though, so have clergy. For decades, clergy have recast
communications to ensure they fall outside testimonial protection—
thus challenging how essential confidentiality actually is to spiritual
relationships. This Article discusses both why clergy testimony
frequently decides the question of privilege and the corresponding
query of why some clergy break confidences. This understanding
breathes new life into efforts to revise state statutes to reflect the
narrowing privilege rather than perpetuate illusory promises of broad
protection.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE prevailing, two-century-old narrative depicts the clergy privilege
as a battle between state power to compel testimony and secular
commitment to protect spiritual communications.1 If a communication
satisfies the privilege, a court cannot force the speaker or cleric to reveal
the confidence.2 The premise of this narrative is an empirically untested
assumption: only a broad absolute privilege can promote spiritual
relationships, encourage individual autonomy, and mediate legal and
canonical obligations.3 A case-specific or qualified privilege will not
achieve these ends.
1

See, e.g., Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent
Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 489,
489–90 (“Th[e] conflict between the state’s coercive power to collect evidence and the right
to maintain confidential certain religious communications lies at the center of every
challenge to the clergy-penitent privilege.”).
2
See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (“[A] clergyman
shall not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent’s confidential confession . . . at least
absent the penitent’s consent.”); accord Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)
(“[S]uits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the
confessional . . . .”).
3
See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-penitent
privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return.”). For clarity and consistency, this Article uses the
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Judicial decisions continue to perpetuate the untested “empirical
assumption”4 that a broad privilege is essential for clergy-communicant
relationships to thrive.5 This assumption comes at a high cost. It
supports an absolute privilege, which in turn sacrifices the highly
probative, even outcome-determinative evidence contained in such
communications. Nonetheless, this prevailing narrative presupposes
clergy would place the sanctity of confidential communications with
their flocks above judicial truth finding.
What if a different, more nuanced story exists? One where clergy
want to testify about certain communications? And by acting on that
desire, clergy—those presumed most likely to protect it—are actually
narrowing the privilege?
Using data culled from over 700 federal and state clergy privilege
decisions, this Article challenges the “empirical assumption” behind the
absolute privilege. In doing so, it tells this second story. The data
describes a privilege in decline: two-thirds of the time, courts rule
against a privilege assertion.6 More interesting, though, is the clergy’s
reluctance to embrace an absolute privilege. Rather than asserting
bright-line protection, for many, the decision to testify is case specific.
phrase “the clergy privilege” and calls the parties to the privilege “clergy” and
“communicants.” However, even in a single jurisdiction, the privilege goes by many names.
See, e.g., Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 n.* (N.Y. 2001) (noting that the
privilege has been alternatively referred to as the “priest-penitent” privilege, “clergypenitent” privilege, “minister-penitent” privilege, “cleric-congregant” privilege, and “clergycommunicant” privilege (citations omitted)).
4
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Evidentiary
Privileges § 1.2.1 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 1st ed. 2002) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, New
Wigmore]; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking
the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 315, 321–22 (2003) (discussing
the assumptions underlying the traditional justification for privileges); cf. Walter J. Walsh,
The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An Hibernocentric Essay in Postcolonial Jurisprudence, 80
Ind. L.J. 1037, 1084 (2005) (discussing how “legal and political decisions are informed by a
social vision that incorporates particular empirical assumptions about human behavior and
values”).
5
See Ryan v. Ryan, 642 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (Mass. 1994) (holding that the privilege,
unlike most other evidentiary privileges, is “absolute”); R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred
Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent
Privilege?, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1627, 1673 (2003) (discussing how, because of this
assumption, “[t]he clergy-penitent privilege has been applied to a larger class of
communications and a broader class of clergy, and, when it is deemed to apply, it is
considered impenetrable”).
6
See infra Section II.A.
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Consciously or otherwise, and most notably in violent crime cases,
clergy share confidences that are facially protected under broad state
statutory language.7 Thus, the clergy’s interpretation of the privilege is
contributing to its decline.
This narrowing has significant implications given the role of religion
in the United States. Eighty-nine percent of Americans self-identify as
believing in God, a “remarkably high” figure compared to other
advanced countries.8 For religious Americans, faith impacts everyday
life. Religious institutions offer frequent opportunities to interact with
clergy, in which the religious partake.9 From church, to jail, to schools,
to hospitals, people turn to clergy for guidance.10 Given religion’s
ubiquitous nature, perhaps it is unsurprising that forty-five percent of
Americans rely on prayer, personal reflection, or advice from religious
leaders to make major life decisions.11 Communicants bring “everything
from theological quandaries to everyday life challenges” to clergy.12
This context makes the lack of empirical scholarship on clergy
privilege decisions surprising. While existing scholarship effectively
7

See infra Section III.B (substantiating how clergy share confidences that are facially
protected).
8
Pew Research Ctr., U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious (Nov. 3, 2015); see also Mark
Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends 10 (2011) (“It bears repeating that, by
world standards, Americans remain remarkably religious in both belief and practice.”). The
United States houses between 300,000 and 400,000 congregations devoted to hundreds of
different religious denominations. Nancy T. Ammerman, Introduction: Observing Religious
Modern Lives, in Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives 3, 7 (Nancy T.
Ammerman ed., 2007); see also Clifford Grammich et al., Ass’n of Statisticians of Am.
Religious Bodies, 2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations & Membership
Study xv (2012) (identifying 320,000 separate congregations).
9
See generally, e.g., Gary H. Woolverton, Church Ministry by Design: Designing
Effective Ministry for Tomorrow’s Church (2011) (discussing the import of religious
institutions’ influence in activities ranging from gardening to daycare to fine arts).
10
See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So. 2d 557, 560 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (church);
People v. Police, 651 P.2d 430, 430 (Colo. App. 1982) (jail); Woodard v. Jupiter Christian
Sch., 913 So. 2d 1188, 1189–90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (school); Nicholson v. Wittig, 832
S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. App. 1992) (hospital); cf. Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer,
When Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49
DePaul L. Rev. 1, 21 (1999) (“Clergy fill a multitude of personal and professional roles. To
the religious community, they are administrators and advisers, preachers and public figures,
counselors and teachers. To the local community, they are fellow citizens and consumers,
friends and neighbors, parents and spouses.”).
11
Michael Lipka, 5 Facts About Prayer, Pew Research Ctr. (May 4, 2016).
12
Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes: Finding Religion in
Everyday Life 105 (2014).
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explores facets of the privilege, no article to date exhaustively analyzes
this jurisprudence.13 As then–Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, “In an area
where empirical information would be useful, it is scant and
inconclusive.”14 However, any challenge to the “empirical assumption”
must examine the privilege in application—meaning actual judicial
decisions and clergy testimony in those cases. This Article provides such
analysis and, in doing so, debunks this time-honored foundational
presumption.
Part I begins with the origin and subsequent evolution of clergy
privilege statutes across the United States. This history is undebated, so
this Part focuses specifically on the background rules and policy
considerations necessary for the remainder of the argument. Part II
details the results of the jurisprudence review. The heart of the empirical
work underlying the Article, this Part highlights how pivotal clergy
testimony is to privilege determinations. Rather than pushing for
expansive testimonial protection, clergy adopt a more selective,
restrictive conceptualization of the privilege. Part III explores why
courts rely heavily on clergy testimony in deciding privilege assertions
and why some clergy share confidences. Part IV then advocates for a
qualified privilege to bridge the gap between existing, illusory statutory
protection and the realities of the privilege in application. By exorcising
the absolutist assumption, the privilege can serve its public policy goals

13

See, e.g., Taylor L. Anderson, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: A Mormon Perspective, 41
Idaho L. Rev. 55, 57 (2004) (focusing on the privilege’s application to the Mormon faith);
Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1631 (arguing for the expansion of the dangerous person exception
to the privilege); Michael J. Mazza, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82
Marq. L. Rev. 171, 172–73 (1998) (discussing ownership of the privilege); Walsh, supra
note 4, at 1037–38 (discussing the privilege’s application to Irish Catholics); Ari J. Diaconis,
Note, The Religion of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA): Applying the Clergy Privilege to
Certain AA Communications, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (2014) (addressing the
privilege in the context of AA communications). Some discuss the privilege’s history or
constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1700–22 (discussing First
Amendment and Establishment Clause Considerations for the clergy privilege); Jacob M.
Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 95, 95–96 (1983) (discussing history). Other articles that do analyze state privilege law
frequently focus on a single state or survey the statutes rather than case law interpreting
them. See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the ClergyPenitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 225, 231–34 (1998) (surveying state privilege
statutes).
14
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998).
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without unnecessarily compromising the judiciary’s truth-finding
function.
I. THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
The clergy privilege, much like other privileges such as the attorneyclient privilege, is an evidentiary rule that shields certain
communications—in this case spiritual, confidential communications—
from disclosure during litigation.15 In the United States, the privilege
traces back to an 1811 New York decision.16 In People v. Smith, a trial
court compelled a Protestant minister to testify about the defendant’s
confidential admission17 after shielding a sacramental Catholic
confession in an earlier case.18 In response to public outcry, the state’s
legislature enacted a statutory privilege protecting confidential
communications made to all clergy in their professional capacity.19 This
statute served as a rough template for other states, spreading from West
to Northeast, then finally to Southern states.20 All fifty states and the
15

Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.3.8 (explaining how privileges work).
The privilege’s pre-Reformation history is debated; the consensus recognizes that the
privilege did not exist at common law. See, e.g., Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent
Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doctrine, 13 Regent U. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2000) (“While
commonly accepted that the privilege existed in Catholic England, there is some
disagreement as to how the priest-penitent privilege disappeared. Understandably, the
privilege waned as the Anglican Church and other Protestant movements, which did not
require auricular confessions, rose to prominence in England. Wigmore espouses that
without question, after the restoration of the monarchy, no priest-penitent privilege existed at
common law.” (footnotes omitted)); Yellin, supra note 13, at 95–108 (detailing the
privilege’s history and development).
17
N.Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817), reprinted in William F. Cahill, Mutations of the Rule of
Fraud in Marriage, 1 Cath. Law. 185, 198 (1955); see also Yellin, supra note 13, at 106
(briefly discussing the case).
18
People v. Phillips, N.Y.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813), reprinted in 1 W. L.J. 109, 109–13
(1843). Phillips is one of the few decisions to exclude clergy communications on free
exercise grounds. See Lori Lee Brocker, Note, Sacred Secrets: A Call for the Expansive
Application and Interpretation of the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 36 N.Y. L. Sch. L.
Rev. 455, 480 (1991) (discussing the lack of constitutional litigation on the subject);
Anthony Merlino, Note, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional from
Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 Seton Hall L. Rev. 655, 675–709 (2002) (arguing
for Free Exercise Clause “hybrid-rights” protections for the clergy privilege).
19
2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. III, ch. VII, tit. 3, art. 8, § 72 (1829) (since amended).
20
See Walsh, supra note 4, at 1040 (“By the 1960s, through this gradual geographic
embrace of fundamental human rights, the radical alternative of Philips [sic] had challenged
and ultimately overthrown nationwide the archaic legal principles inherited from the colonial
16
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District of Columbia now have clergy privilege statutes.21 While many
of these statutes originally shielded confessions or religiously obligated
communications,22 over time, almost all states expanded protection.23
This is in stark contrast to other evidentiary rules, which have seen a
“significant[] liberaliz[ing of] the admissibility of evidence” post–World
War II.24
These state statutes actively shape the federal privilege law. Rather
than a specific clergy privilege, Congress instead passed Rule of

regime. The last holdouts were in the Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, and New Hampshire),
in the South (Alabama and Mississippi), and in Texas.”).
21
Ala. Code § 12-21-166 (2012); Alaska R. Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2233
(2016), 13-4062(3) (2010); Ark. R. Evid. 505; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1030–34 (Deering
2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146b (2015); Del.
R. Evid. 505; D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2016); Ga. Code. Ann. § 24-5502 (2013); Haw. R. Evid. 506; Idaho Code § 9-203(3) (2010); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803
(2016); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Iowa Code § 622.10 (2017); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 60-429 (2005); Ky. R. Evid. Ann. 505; La. Stat. Ann. § 13:3734.2 (2006); La.
Code Evid. Ann. art. 511 (2017); Me. R. Evid. 505; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9111 (LexisNexis 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016); Mass. R. Evid. 510; Mich.
Comp. Laws Serv. §§ 600.2156 (LexisNexis 2004), 767.5a(2) (LexisNexis 2002); Minn.
Stat. § 595.02(1)(c) (2016); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-22 (2012); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.060(4)
(2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-506 (2016); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 49.255 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:35 (2007); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); N.M. R. Evid. 11-506; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Consol.
2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (2015); N.D. R. Evid. 505; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2317.02(c) (LexisNexis 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2505 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 40.260 (2015); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5943 (West 2017); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 9-17-23 (2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-90 (2014); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-19-505
(2016); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-1-206 (2000); Tex. R. Evid. 505; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1137(3) (LexisNexis 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1607 (2002); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-400,
19.2-271.3 (2015); Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(3) (2016); W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-39 (LexisNexis 2012); Wis. Stat. § 905.06 (2015–16); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101(a)(ii)
(2017). By the start of the twenty-first century, almost every state had enacted a clergy
privilege statute, many of which legislatures subsequently amended to expand statutory
protection. See, e.g., Merlino, supra note 18, at 699 n.86 (listing clergy privilege statutes
enacted by 2002); see also infra Part III and accompanying notes (discussing these
amendments).
22
See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02 (West 2000) (since amended); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 1607 (1973) (since amended); Crawford and Moses’ Digest of the Statutes of
Arkansas, § 4148 (1927) (repealed).
23
The New Jersey statute illustrates this evolution. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:81-9
(West 1947) (protecting “a confession”), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1960)
(protecting “confessions and other communications made in confidence”). See also State v.
J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1127–28 (N.J. 2010) (detailing the statute’s evolution).
24
Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 5.
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Evidence 501, a catch-all privilege, which states, “The common law—as
interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and
experience—governs a claim of privilege.”25 Federal courts turn to state
privilege decisions to interpret Rule 501.26 Further, under Rule 501,
federal courts apply state privilege law in diversity and nonfederal
question criminal cases.27 Consequently, federal clergy privilege
decisions are scant.28 The Supreme Court only addressed the privilege in
pre–Rule 501 dicta,29 and post–Rule 501 circuit court clergy decisions
are limited.30
25

Fed. R. Evid. 501. Initially, the Proposed Rules of Evidence and Model Rules of
Evidence included a specific clergy privilege. See Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973); Model Code Evid. 219 (Am. Law Inst. 1942).
The Proposed Rule was never adopted. See Introduction: The Development of Evidentiary
Privileges in American Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1454, 1466 (1985). While the 1973 Proposed
Rules debates challenged other privileges, they did not challenge the clergy privilege. See In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); Stephen A.
Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 333 (4th ed. 1986).
Eleven statutes are fashioned from the Model Rules, twelve mirror Proposed Rule of
Evidence 506, while the remainder are unique to the particular state.
26
See, e.g., Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on Michigan
clergy privilege jurisprudence).
27
Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also Fed. R. Evid. 501 advisory committee’s note (“It is intended
that the State rules of privilege should apply equally in original diversity actions and
diversity actions removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).”); 19 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4512 (2d ed. 2002) (describing interaction between state
and federal privilege and collecting cases).
28
Since 1971, only twenty-three federal decisions addressed the clergy privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dubé, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987); Seidman v. Fishburne–Hudgins
Educ. Found., 724 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding employee’s business communications to priest were not protected by
priest-penitent privilege); United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828, 828 (9th Cir. 1980);
Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (observing that “[t]he ‘priestpenitent’ privilege has clearly been recognized by federal courts”).
29
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 906, 913 (1980) (analogizing the clergy and the
adverse spousal testimonial privileges); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)
(“[A]n attorney or a priest may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in
professional confidence.”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (dismissing a
secret agent’s contract claim, noting such claims “would require a disclosure of the
confidences of the confessional”).
30
The Third Circuit has expressly held the clergy privilege exists under Rule 501—a
position other circuits have assumed. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,
377 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Dubé, 820 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
communications made to clergyman to avoid tax obligations were not privileged); United
States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant’s business
communications to priest were not protected).
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While variation exists,31 the common broad strokes for federal and
state clergy privileges require a: (1) confidential, (2) spiritual
communication, (3) made to a cleric in his professional capacity.32 The
individual asserting the clergy privilege bears the burden.33 The privilege
is absolute, meaning unlike a qualified privilege, a case-specific
showing of a compelling need for the underlying information cannot
override it.34
Like other privileges, the clergy privilege furthers an “extrinsic social
policy”35 deemed worthy of protection at a cost to justice. The loss of
this testimony can “distort the record, mislead the factfinder, and
undermine the central truth-seeking function of the courts.”36 To
minimize this potential, privileges must be narrowly tailored to serve a
particular social policy goal.37
While agreeing on the “empirical assumption” underlying the
privilege, courts and scholars debate the particular “extrinsic social

31

Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege
and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 1127, 1133 (2003);
Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1641; Colombo, supra note 13, at 232.
32
Statutes phrase the requirements differently. Compare Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (1981)
(privileging communications “made by any person professing religious faith, seeking
spiritual comfort, or seeking counseling”), with Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2017) (protecting
communications made “for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel and advice”). Further,
some courts collapse the requirements or renumber them. Compare Roman Catholic
Archbishop v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (listing three
requirements), with Elliott v. State, 49 So. 3d 795, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (listing
four requirements).
33
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.15 (3d Cir. 1990); People
v. Schultz, 557 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
34
Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.2.1, at 13–14 (defining absolute and
conditional privileges); see also Robert B. Gibbons, Evidence—Defendant Must Establish
Relevancy Before Obtaining Access to Sexual Abuse Victim’s Privileged Records—
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d 990 (1993), 28 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
243, 247 n.22 (1994) (same).
35
Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 3.
36
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 413 (1998) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the impact of privileges generally).
37
See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (holding that a privilege
should apply “only where necessary to achieve its purpose”); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[T]hese exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
truth.”).
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policy” the privilege serves.38 For example, the traditional justification—
the one case law most references—focuses on the need to foster
religious relationships by stimulating the growth of communications
between clergy and communicants.39 This justification assumes a causal
relationship: but for the privilege, people would be unwilling to share
confidences with clergy.40 Thus, the privilege has little to no cost to
justice. As Justice Stevens explains, “Without a privilege, much of the
desirable evidence to which litigants such as [plaintiffs] seek
access . . . is unlikely to come into being.”41
Dean Wigmore, the seminal force behind evidence scholarship, is best
known for advancing this justification. In doing so, Wigmore hoped to
eliminate—or at least, significantly narrow—the slew of privileges he
saw as obstructing justice.42 However, he viewed the clergy privilege as
unique, believing it satisfied his four evaluative criteria necessary for an
absolute privilege:
(1) The clergy privilege involves communications that originate in
a confidence that the communications will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality is essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The clergy-communicant relationship is one which in the opinion
of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications is greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.43
38

See generally Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged
Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1471 (1985) (discussing the competing theoretical
justifications for privileges).
39
26 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5612 (2d ed. 2002).
40
Id.
41
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1996) (applying the instrumental rationale to the
psychotherapist privilege); accord Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408
(1998) (adopting similar rationale for attorney-client privilege).
42
See 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2286, at 532,
§ 2380a, at 72–73 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (1904) [hereinafter Wigmore]; id. § 2192,
at 72–73, § 2285, at 527. Jeremy Bentham equally questioned privileges while respecting the
clergy privilege. 4 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 589–91 (1827).
43
See 8 Wigmore, supra note 42, §§ 2285, 2396; see also 8 John Henry Wigmore,
Wigmore on Evidence § 2396, at 877 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (asserting utilitarian
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Though uncodified, these factors frequently appear in federal or state
decisions.44
Contemporary evidence scholars, in particular Professor Edward
Imwinkelried, challenge this rationale as based on mere “empirical
assumption.”45 He maintains religious individuals would engage in such
communications regardless of the privilege.46 As he explains, “It is an
insult to the sincerity of a fideist’s belief to argue that he or she will
make a doctrinally required confession only if the legal system confers
an evidentiary privilege on the confession.”47
Imwinkelried, instead, posits autonomy and democratic rationales for
privileges. On the autonomy front, privileges arguably advance personal
decision making, permit emotional release, and promote selfevaluation.48 On the democratic theory front, he contends society finds it
“offensive” and “shocking” to compel such testimony.49 Still other
scholars justify the privilege based on the assumption that, “Generally,
ministers will not testify, regardless of what the trial judge says or does
to them.”50

and historical justifications). But see Walsh, supra note 4, at 1084 (criticizing Wigmore’s
historical argument for the clergy privilege).
44
See, e.g., Towbin v. Antonacci, 287 F.R.D. 672, 675 (S.D. Fla. 2012); State v. J.G., 990
A.2d 1122, 1140 (N.J. 2010); Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Tex. App. 1992).
45
Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 1.2.1, at 11–12 (“Many contemporary
privilege rules rest on the empirical assumption that the rules cause the typical layperson to
engage in desirable conduct . . . that supposedly would not occur but for the existence of an
evidentiary privilege. On that assumption, the legal system’s recognition of evidentiary
privileges comes cost free.”).
46
Id. § 6.2.3, at 467–68.
47
Id.; see also 1 George E. Dix et al., McCormick on Evidence § 76.2, at 139 (Kenneth S.
Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (recognizing such communications occur “irrespective of the
presence or absence of evidentiary privilege”).
48
See Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 6.2.3, at 469 (“Indeed, the humanistic
case for this privilege is stronger than the corresponding case for any other privilege. A
person’s religious beliefs lie at the core of the decisional autonomy needed to develop his or
her life plan.”).
49
Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 6.2.3, at 470; see also Mary Harter
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy
Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 723, 768 (1987) (“[T]here is [a]
general repugnance at the law’s intrusion into such a relationship.”).
50
Weldon Ponder, Will Your Pastor Tell?, Liberty Mag., May-June 1978, at 3. Still others
contend existing privileges are not so much rooted in encouraging communication or
protecting privacy but rather reflect political power by groups who have sought and obtained
special treatment. See, e.g., Eric D. Green & Charles R. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and
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While case law echoes these varied rationales,51 the traditional,
Wigmorean justification remains primary.52 Further, despite their
differences, these various rationales share a common outcome: an
absolute, broadly construed clergy privilege, assumed essential to serve
political or societal gains.53
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE: SURVEY AND RESULTS
Testing the Wigmorean “empirical assumption” requires a macro
understanding of the privilege in application. This includes the
privilege’s most litigated requirements, temporal trends, and
transsubstantive application. An exhaustive analysis of clergy privilege
decisions provides such an understanding.54 This Part starts with the
specifics of this exhaustive case law survey and its surprising results.
Rather than a privilege afforded judicial respect, the survey finds a
dying privilege. Even more interesting, though, is the role of clergy in
this decline. Existing empirical work on clergy and confidentiality,
though discrete, depicts clergy strictly beholden to their perceived
obligation to maintain confidences.55 However, as this Part goes on to
Materials on Evidence 526 (1983); see also Modes of Analysis, supra note 38, at 1471
(discussing competing rationales).
51
See, e.g., Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301, 308 (Tex. App. 1994) (citations
omitted) (discussing how the privilege benefits privacy, freedom of religion, the prestige of
religious institutions, and avoids judicial versus canonical strife).
52
See, e.g., Waters v. O’Connor, 103 P.3d 292, 296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (justifying the
privilege on the basis of individuals’ need to speak in “total and absolute confidence”);
Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718, 737 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (“The evidentiary privilege
extends to parties and witnesses to advance public policy objectives in maintaining
confidentiality for communications essential to a relationship society deems worthy of
protection.”); McFarland v. W. Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lorain, Ohio, Inc., 60
N.E.3d 39, 46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (same).
53
Case law and scholars routinely characterize the privilege as absolute. See, e.g., In re
Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 427–29 (1970); Misenheimer v. Burris, 183 N.C. App. 408, 412
(2007); 81 Am. Jr. 2d Witnesses § 493 (2006); Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1674 (“[U]nlike
other professional privileges, the clergy-penitent privilege, when applicable, is considered
absolute.”).
54
All data is on file with author and available upon request. See Bartholomew Clergy Data
(Jan. 17, 2017) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). This data includes all
available federal and state clergy privilege cases, identified either as a statutory annotation or
by searching “clergy” /s “privilege.” In states where the privilege is broken into multiple
statutes, annotations to each statute were included. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1030–34
(Deering 2004).
55
See Elizabeth Audette, 115.3 The Christian Century 80 (1998).
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explain, this hypothetical obligation does not translate to actual
scenarios. Rather, clergy’s testimony and pre-litigation conduct for three
key privilege requirements supports a more qualified, more restricted
privilege.
A. Survey Details
As previously detailed in Part I, current clergy privilege statutes
provide generous protection. For example, statutes define clergy
expansively to include priests, rabbis, ordained or licensed ministers of
any church, and accredited Christian Science practitioners in all fifty
states.56 Six state statutes also protect any persons authorized to perform
similar functions of any religion.57 Additionally, every state now
safeguards more communications beyond sacramental confessions,
ranging from spiritual advice to communications of comfort.58 States’
expanded coverage triggered a corresponding rise in the number of
assertions in written decisions, as depicted in Figure 1. From 1835 to
1980, there were only 63 reported clergy privilege decisions. By the end
of the 1990s, that number grew to 175. By December 2016, the end date
of this survey, 324 written opinions squarely decided a clergy privilege
assertion.59
Figure 1

56
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-166(a)(1) (2012); Alaska R. Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§§ 12-2233 (2016), 13-4062(3) (2010); Ark. R. Ev. 505(a)(1); Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1030–34;
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146b (2015); Del R. Evid.
505(a)(1).
57
See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013); Ky. R. Evid. Ann. 505(a)(1); La. Code
Evid. Ann. art. 511(A)(1) (2017); Miss. R. Evid. 506(a)(1); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23
(West 2011); Utah R. Evid. 503(a)(1).
58
What is “more” varies from state to state, but often includes spiritual advice, solace, or
comfort. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233 § 20A (2016) (“religious or spiritual advice or
comfort”); Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016) (“religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort”); Mo.
Rev. St. 491.060 (2016) (advice, confession, comfort); N.M. R. Evid. 11-506 (advice).
59
This number is a subset of the total reviewed decisions. It excludes dicta or remand
decisions.

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1028

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 103:1015

Criminal cases outnumbered civil ones almost two to one.60 Murder
cases most frequently trigger an assertion of privilege, with sex crimes a
close second, as shown in Figure 2.61
Figure 2

Successful assertion of the privilege is an increasing rarity. Figure 3
illustrates how this decline began in the 1980s, picked back up slightly
in the 1990s, then dropped again in 2000.62 Between 2000 and 2016, the
percent of clergy privilege assertions granted fell to a low of twenty-six
percent.
60
See Bartholomew Clergy Data, supra note 54 (recording 219 criminal decisions and 105
civil claims).
61
Sex crimes include: sexual abuse, rape, sexual assault, sexual misconduct, crimes
against nature, indecent contact with children, child molestation, lewd conduct, sexual
harassment, and bigamy. Personal crimes include: manslaughter, child abuse, assault, threat
of force, police misconduct, mutilation of a deceased body, and wrongful death. Property
crimes include: fraud, burglary, theft, damages claims, forgery, robbery, embezzlement,
arson, and armed robbery. The “family” category includes: divorce, child custody, alienation
of affection, parental custody, termination of parental rights, and paternity.
62
Pre-1900s, the courts denied the privilege seventy-one percent of the time, but this
figure is based on only seven written decisions. By the 1950s, this number was seventy-eight
percent, based solely on twenty-three written decisions. To minimize statistical sample size
issues, this Article concentrates on current trends.
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Figure 3

Viewed separately, courts appear less willing to apply the privilege in
criminal cases, where courts deny the privilege seventy-five percent of
the time, versus civil cases, where the overall denial rate is fifty-five
percent. However, while courts historically afforded the privilege more
deference in civil cases, currently criminal and civil cases are more
closely aligned, as reflected in Figure 4.
Figure 4
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This temporal tracking does not encompass cases where judges
summarily address the privilege. Nor can it reflect any decision by
counsel to avoid calling clergy in the first place. It does, however,
indicate which statutory requirements trigger litigation. Scholars
predicted litigation over the “clergy” requirement.63 However, it has
actually generated minimal conflict, likely because most standards
define clergy expansively.64 Similarly, ownership and waiver are fairly
63
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 13, at 232 (discussing how a lack of clear statutory
definition would “generate needless litigation over this issue”).
64
Thirty-nine states have adopted a generous definition of clergy, protecting
communications to “a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a
church or of a religious denomination or religious organization.” Ala. Code § 12-21-166
(2012); Alaska R. Evid. 506; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4062(3) (2010); Ark. R. Evid. 505;
Cal. Evid. Code § 1030 (Deering 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146b (2015); Del. R. Evid. 505; D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla.
Stat. § 90.505 (2016); Ga. Code. Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013); Haw. R. Evid. 506; Idaho Code
§ 9-203(3) (2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-429 (2005); Ky. R. Evid. Ann. 505; La. Code Evid.
Ann. art. 511 (2017); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-111 (LexisNexis 2013); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016); Mass. R. Evid. 510; Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767.5a(2)
(LexisNexis 2002); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.060(4) (2016); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-506 (2016);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 516:35 (2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); N.M. R.
Evid. 11-506; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (2015); N.D. R. Evid. 505; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2317.02(C)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2505 (2011); 42 Pa. Stat. and
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5943 (West 2017); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); S.C. Code Ann.
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well settled. The vast majority of jurisdictions grant the communicant
ownership of the privilege.65 Further, most jurisdictions find the
privilege waived when a communicant fails to object, fails to take
reasonable precautions, shares the content of the communication with a
third party, or proactively waives the privilege in court.66
As depicted in Figure 5, when a court denies the privilege, it is
usually because the proponent fails to establish: (1) the cleric acted in
his professional capacity, (2) there was a spiritual communication, or (3)
the communication was confidential. In analyzing clergy privilege
decisions, one pattern quickly emerges: courts rely heavily on clergy
testimony for these requirements.
Figure 5

§ 19-11-90 (2014); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-19-505 (2016); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1206 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137(3) (LexisNexis 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 1607 (2002); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-400, 19.2-271.3 (2015); W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-9
(LexisNexis 2012); Wis. Stat. § 905.06 (2015–16).
65
The communicant owns the privilege in all but six states. See Ala. R. Evid. 505; Cal.
Evid. Code §§ 912, 917, 1030–34 (Deering 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c)
(2017); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-22 (2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 40.260 (2015). Thirty-five statutes spell out this ownership, while case law
settles the question in the remaining states.
66
See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-34 (2015) (failure to object); Haw. R. Evid. 511 (third
party); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Consol. 2003) (court waiver); Utah R. Evid. 510(a)
(reasonable precautions). Waiver—generally meaning whether either the communicant or
the cleric disclosed the information to a third party—is also a frequent ground for denying
the privilege. However, waiver issues are often governed by separate statutes and thus are
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 502 (2017); Mass. Guide
to Evid. § 523; N.M. R. Evid. 11-511.
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The next Sections detail how this testimony challenges the need for an
absolute privilege.67
B. The Professional Capacity Requirement
Every state limits the clergy privilege to communications that occur in
the cleric’s professional capacity as a spiritual advisor.68 Communicants
asserting the privilege uniformly contend clergy were acting in their
professional capacity. In contrast, as discussed below, clergy define
professional capacity more narrowly, not always convincingly
distinguishing their spiritual and other religious work. Not only do these
more restrictive characterizations contribute to the privilege’s decline,
they also impugn the “empirical assumption” that an absolute, broad
clergy privilege is essential to “sedulously foster[]”69 religious
relationships—at least not to clergy.

67

This is not to say that courts always defer to clergy. On rare occasion, courts have
upheld the privilege even when the clergy was willing to testify. See, e.g., Mullen v. United
States, 263 F.2d 275, 276–77 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring) (finding privilege in
child abuse case where Lutheran minister encouraged defendant to confess but was
subsequently willing to testify at trial about the spiritual confession).
68
This element is uniform across the states, though not every statute catalogues it.
Compare, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013) (no codified professional capacity
requirement), with, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803 (2016) (codified professional capacity
requirement).
69
8 Wigmore, supra note 42, §§ 2285, 2396 (footnote omitted).
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As clergy delineate their roles as spiritual advisors, the boundaries of
what responsibilities fall within “professional capacity” vary. However,
case law indicates a cleric is more likely to disclose: (1) conversations
with employees, (2) discussions with friends, and (3) exchanges
regarding factual investigations.
First, with employees or other church staff, clergy define their
professional capacity narrowly, even though the line between employer
and spiritual advisor can blur. For example, in Bonds v. State,70 the
witness, Brown, was a local minister and owner of the air conditioning
business where the defendant, Bonds, worked. Bonds occasionally
attended Brown’s church and had previously sought ministering from
Brown. Nonetheless, for the conversation at issue, which involved
allegations of sexual misconduct, Brown “testified without contradiction
that he made the call as Bonds’ employer” without distinguishing this
conversation from prior counseling sessions.71 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas upheld the trial court’s wholesale reliance on Brown’s
characterization, finding the privilege did not apply because Brown was
not acting in his “capacity as a spiritual advisor.”72
Second, clergy frequently treat their ministerial capacity as mutually
exclusive from their roles as friends, even when the two commingle.73
The Court of Appeals of Iowa addressed this issue in State v.
McCurdy.74 McCurdy was convicted of sexual abuse, in part based on
the testimony of his longtime friend and pastor, Acker. During a phone
call, McCurdy told Acker he was under investigation and then detailed
his transgressions. The two then prayed together and explored
McCurdy’s desire to be baptized. Acker advised McCurdy “to seek God
and to give [his] life and heart over to God and ask for God’s help with
this matter.” At the end of the conversation, McCurdy, at Acker’s
70

837 S.W.2d 881 (Ark. 1992).
Id. at 883.
72
Id. at 884.
73
But see, e.g., State v. Boling, 806 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (finding
privilege because clergy testified “he didn’t distinguish between being the defendant’s
minister or friend on that occasion”). On rare occasion, a court rejects a cleric’s delineation
between friend and spiritual advisor. See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So. 2d 557, 561 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1998) (disregarding pastor’s claim the conversation with defendant occurred
outside her professional capacity because her “status as a pastor influenced the appellant’s
decision to telephone her”).
74
823 N.W.2d 418, 2012 WL 4901158 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012).
71
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urging, accepted “Christ as his savior.” Nonetheless, Acker testified the
conversation fell outside his professional capacity, stating:
I am a pastor, but I’m also a spiritual man, a man who loves God
dearly. And so . . . as I’m talking to my sister or to my other
friends . . . my parents even, I regularly offer spiritual guidance and
advice. So to say that because I was offering him some spiritual advice
that I was doing that in my ministerial capacity, I would definitely
have to say no.75

Relying on this testimony, the court discounted the conversation’s
religious nature, agreeing that Acker did not act in his professional
capacity.76 Thus, once again, clergy testimony barred the privilege.
Third, and perhaps more notable, are cases where clergy distinguish
their roles as disciplinarians,77 confronters,78 informants,79 mediators,80
or even neutral bystanders81 from their religious professional capacity.
These distinctions frequently arise when congregants are accused of or
are victims of abuse.82

75

Id. at *3 (alterations in original).
Id.
77
See, e.g., Kos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 633, 639–40 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding lack of
professional capacity because “Father Broderick testified that, at the time of the meeting, he
was not concerned about the ‘state of [appellant’s] soul’; rather, he described the meeting as
a ‘disciplinary intervention’” (alteration in original)).
78
Fahlfeder v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 470 A.2d 1130, 1132–33 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984) (discussing how reverend did not act in his professional capacity in confronting
defendant about abuse allegations); Maldonado v. State, 59 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App.
2001) (denying privilege based on cleric’s representation that “the specific purpose of the
meetings was to confront him about the allegations of his inappropriate behavior”).
79
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, No. M2000-00763-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 812254, at *7
(Tenn. Crim. App. July 18, 2001) (denying privilege where cleric acted as an informant, not
as a spiritual advisor).
80
See, e.g., State v. Scoggins, 70 So. 3d 145, 149 (La. Ct. App. 2011), writ denied sub
nom. State v. Scoggin, 79 So. 3d 1033, 1033 (La. 2012).
81
See, e.g., State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 6 (Conn. 2011); State v. Latham, No. E200602262-CCA-R3CD, 2008 WL 748381, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2008).
82
This narrowing lacks uniformity. Compare, e.g., People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307,
312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (illustrating how some clerics view investigating sexual abuse
allegations as part of their professional responsibility as a spiritual advisor), with, e.g., State
v. Hesse, 767 N.W.2d 420, 2009 WL 776530, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing
clerics’ role as spiritual advisor from investigator).
76
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Magar v. State,83 a criminal case involving allegations of sexual abuse
by a church member, highlights this overlap. Reverend Rowe, a witness
in the case, had many prior counseling sessions with the appellant. The
Reverend
testified
it
was
his
practice
“to
keep
confidential . . . information gained in a counseling relationship.”
Similarly, the appellant testified that the Reverend assured him “their
conversations were private.”84 The Reverend testified he “confronted”
Magar after allegations that he sexually abused two boys. At trial, the
Reverend framed the conversation as “disciplinary in nature.”85 This
framing helped the Supreme Court of Arkansas sweep aside the
Reverend’s original promise to Magar of nondisclosure.86 Rather, the
court allowed the testimony, holding the conversation took place outside
the Reverend’s professional capacity.87
Clergy maintain this constricted definition of professional capacity
even though in many cases such conversations begin as confrontations
but evolve into confessions, and sometimes even spiritual repentance.
For example, in Gutierrez v. State, a priest confronted the defendant
about his daughter’s allegations of sexual abuse.88 After contacting the
police, Father Minifie called Gutierrez. During this conversation,
Gutierrez confessed and sought spiritual guidance on how to move
forward. The conversation was overtly religious, as the two discussed
reading the Bible and the need to “let the Lord take care of this
situation.”89 At trial, the priest “testified that the purpose of the call was
not to provide spiritual advice, and he was not calling in the capacity of
a spiritual advisor.”90 Relying on this restrictive interpretation of a
clergy’s professional capacity, the court denied the privilege.91 This
decision, too, shows clergy’s testimony challenging the need for a broad,
absolute privilege.
Professional capacity is not the only requirement where clergy
testimony challenges the Wigmorean empirical assumption. As
83

826 S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1992).
Id. at 222.
85
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
Id. at 225 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 223.
88
No. 01-09-00939-CR, 2010 WL 4484350, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2010).
89
Id. at *1–2.
90
Id. at *2.
91
Id. at *1.
84
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discussed next, this testimony suggests fewer communications need
protection.
C. The Protected Communication Requirement
Clergy testimony also undercuts the traditional justification that an
absolute privilege is “essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relationship between the parties.”92 Originally, the privilege only
protected sacramental confessions,93 recognizing that Catholic priests
who broke such sacraments faced excommunication.94 Other religions
do not view oral confession as a sacrament, or they permit a
communicant to confess directly to God without a priest intermediary.95
Rather than foreclose the privilege to non-Catholics, states expanded
coverage to more than sacramental confessions. What additional
communications are protected varies, as some states privilege all
religiously required communications and others go further. With either
approach, though, clergy testimony chips at the scope of potentially
privileged communications.
First, some statutes now shield any communications necessary under
a religious tenet.96 This limitation frequently appears as statutory
92

8 Wigmore, supra note 42, § 2285 (footnote omitted).
Confession is one of seven Catholic sacraments. General Council of Trent, Seventh
Session, Decree on the Sacraments, Canon I, No. 1311 (1547), reprinted in J. Neuner, S.J. &
J. Dupois, S.J., The Christian Faith: In the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church 522
(Jacques Dupuis ed., 6th ed. 1998); see also Kevin Orlin Johnson, Why Do Catholics Do
That?: A Guide to the Teachings and Practices of the Catholic Church 214–15 (1994) (listing
“Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Reconciliation, Matrimony, Holy Orders, and the
Anointing of the Sick”).
94
The Code of Canon Law 246, Can. 1388, § 1 (1983); see, e.g., Andrew A. Beerworth,
Treating Spiritual and Legal Counselors Differently: Mandatory Reporting Laws and the
Limitations of Current Free Exercise Doctrine, 10 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 73, 105–06
(2004) (detailing the importance of confession in Catholic faith).
95
This is true for Protestantism and Judaism, for example. See, e.g., William Harold
Tiemann & John C. Bush, The Right to Silence: Privileged Clergy Communication and the
Law 23 (1983); Chad Horner, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent
Privilege in a Diverse Society, 45 Drake L. Rev. 697, 698 (1997).
96
Courts disagree whether the “discipline-enjoined” requirement also requires crossreferencing religious tenets. Compare Nussbaumer v. State, 882 So. 2d 1067, 1076 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Although the interpretation of the discipline enjoined requirement is
by no means uniform, the modern trend is to interpret it as requiring only that the confider
consulted the clergy member in his or her professional capacity.”), with State v. Martin, 975
P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1999) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060 (1995)) (interpreting
the phrase “confession [made] . . . in the course of discipline enjoined by the church” to
93
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language privileging communications “in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which he belongs.”97 This “disciplineenjoined” restriction affords clergy significant, frequently outcomedeterminative influence, as courts maintain it is not their “role to decide
what types of communications constitute confessions within the
meaning of a particular religion.”98 While over two-thirds of the clergy
decisions involve Protestants, even in cases involving Judaism, Santeria,
and Islam, courts have favored clergy testimony to determine whether a
particular conversation was spiritual—despite contrary evidence from
the communicant.99
Even for sacramental confessions, clergy adopt a case-specific
approach, rejecting any categorical definition of a privileged
communication. For example, in one case a Catholic priest received
confession of a murder for which two others were convicted and
sentenced. The priest, Father Towle, provided absolution for
wrongdoing but struggled for years regarding whether to break the seal
of confession and risk excommunication by sharing this information to
avoid the continued incarceration of two innocent men. With the
assistance of officials at the diocese, the priest decided he could share
the confessed communication after all. Rather than maintaining it was a
sacramental confession, the priest revised his view with the assistance of

mean a cleric’s doctrinal obligations to hear a confidence, not a parishioner’s obligation to
confide), and State v. Price, 881 A.2d 1082, 1085 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (collapsing
Pennsylvania’s “discipline-enjoined” and “professional capacity” requirements). See also
Cassidy, supra note 13, at 1640–44 (discussing the conflicting interpretations of the
“discipline enjoined” requirement in some state clergy privilege statutes).
97
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4062(3) (2010); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (2017);
D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2016); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-803 (2016);
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016);
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 767.5a(2) (LexisNexis 2002); Minn. Stat. § 595.02(1)(c) (2016);
Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); 9 R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-271.3, 8.01-400 (2015); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 57-3-9 (LexisNexis 2012); cf. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1642 n.77 (“So entrenched is the
‘discipline enjoined’ requirement in the history of the privilege that some courts cite it as a
prerequisite to the application of the privilege, notwithstanding the fact that the statute that
they are construing contains no such language.”).
98
State v. Martin, 959 P.2d 152, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 975 P.2d 1020 (Wash.
1999).
99
See, e.g., People v. Drelich, 506 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (App. Div. 1986) (Judaism); State v.
Gil, No. 2 CA–CR 2013–0508, 2014 WL 4725805, at *1, *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2014)
(Santeria); People v. Johnson, 497 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 1985) (Islam).
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the Archdiocese, describing the communication as a “heart-to-heart,”
thus taking it outside the context of a sacramental confession. In
affirming this characterization, the Southern District of New York
pointed out it was “in no position to second-guess Father Towle or the
Archdiocese in this respect.”100
Other jurisdictions reject the “discipline-enjoined” requirement.
Figure 6 depicts how, facially, these state statutes privilege confidential
communications,101 “religious or spiritual advice or comfort,”102 or—
more generally—“any communication” that otherwise satisfies the
statute.103
Figure 6

While many decisions apply this broad coverage literally,104 others adopt
more fact-specific approaches to define the communications
requirement.105
100

Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
See, e.g., Ala. R. Evid. 505.
102
See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016).
103
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2011); see also Horner, supra note 95, at
729–30 (“Today . . . the privilege is extended to protect conversations between spiritual
leaders of non-Catholic Western religious groups and followers of those religions.”).
104
See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So. 2d 557, 560 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (covering
more than just penitential communication); Reardon v. Savill, No. CV 950546948, 1999 WL
101
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In this absence of a clear demarcation, clergy have resisted the
privilege in scenarios that facially fall within statutory protection. This
more restrictive view means clergy have willingly testified when part of
the conversation is not spiritual, even if the remainder of the
communication is overtly religious.106
In this way, clergy have identified a narrower category of
communications they are willing to withhold from the eyes of the law
than the wide swath of communications privileged by statute. Much like
how clergy distinguish their other roles from their professional capacity,
clergy delineate spiritual conversations as mutually exclusive from
discussions of “family problems,”107 investigations,108 or “disciplinary”
1063195, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1999) (covering “solace”); Commonwealth v.
Nutter, 28 N.E.3d 1, 3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (covering “rules or practice of the religious
body to which [the cleric] belongs”), review denied, 35 N.E.3d 721 (Mass. 2015); People v.
Bragg, 824 N.W.2d 170, 182 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (covering “any communication”);
Congregation B’Nai Jonah v. Kuriansky, 576 N.Y.S.2d 934, 936 (App. Div. 1991) (covering
“counsel, advice, solace, absolution or ministration”).
105
Judicial treatment of pastoral counseling highlights this tension. Compare Nussbaumer
v. State, 882 So. 2d 1067, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]here are probably many
instances in which it would be difficult to distinguish a call to personal growth based on a
spiritual message from one that is only psychotherapeutic in origin . . . . Fortunately,
[Florida’s clergy privilege statute] does not require the courts to assess the spiritual content
of the clergy member’s response to the confider’s request for spiritual advice and counsel.”),
with Brown v. State, 964 A.2d 516, 540–41 (R.I. 2009) (probing beyond the representation
that the communication was pastoral counseling to segregate secular from nonsecular
communications).
106
See, e.g., State v. McCary, No. 03C01-9303-CR-00103, 1994 WL 176972, at *7 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 11, 1994) (noting the pastor “sought to minister,” but defendant did not
seek spiritual advice), rev’d on other grounds, 922 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1996); Snyder v.
State, 68 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. App. 2000) (accepting youth director’s characterization of
the communication as not privileged even though director conceded the conversation
“involved God and religion”). This difference is not universal. See, e.g., State v. J.G., 990
A.2d 1122, 1124 (N.J. 2010); EMC, LLC v. Cooper, No. F–46467–08, 2012 WL 5381688, at
*10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (referencing the cleric’s willingness to testify but
disregarding it).
107
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1159 (Mass. 2009)
(characterizing the conversation at issue as a “family issue”); State v. Cardenas, No. A130775, 2014 WL 1516335, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (holding a discussion of a
family problem not to be covered by the privilege).
108
See, e.g., State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 143 (La. 1996) (denying privilege based on
minister’s statement that he was “visiting Tart . . . to question him as to whether his civil
rights were violated,” not to engage in spiritual communications, despite praying together);
State v. Weeks, 858 N.W.2d 36, 2014 WL 5243359, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (“[The
pastor] testified at a hearing that he and [defendant] did not talk about religious matters, but
they were ‘two cycling buddies talking.’”).
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discussions.109 In other cases, clergy testify that the communicant was
not confessing but “trying to explain his side of the story”110 or “popping
off.”111
For example, in State v. Cartmell, the chaplain witness testified about
a communication with the defendant in a murder case.112 The chaplain
had accompanied the police and the defendant on a car ride to the
victim’s mother’s house. During the ride and at the scene, the defendant
told the chaplain details about the murder. According to the defendant,
he and the chaplain prayed together at the scene, though the chaplain
denied this. While the chaplain acknowledged he was there in his
professional capacity, he maintained the communication was not
spiritual but rather an opportunity for the defendant to “try[] to make
peace, [to make] sense of what happened.”113 Relying on this
characterization, the court found the privilege did not apply.114
Similarly, in State v. Hancock, the defendant had several
conversations with his pastor in which he admitted that he had been the
last person to see the murder victim alive.115 The pastor maintained that
“no spiritual counseling took place during that conversation,”116 despite
acknowledging he offered spiritual counsel at other times and that
109
Magar, 826 S.W.2d at 222–23 (finding privilege inapplicable to defendant’s admission
to minister’s accusation of sexual abuse of minors where minister initiated conversation for
disciplinary, not spiritual, counseling).
110
Elliott v. State, 49 So. 3d 795, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“According to elder
Westbrook, appellant did not indicate that he was seeking spiritual counseling and guidance
and did not want to talk about the Bible or pray. The trial court could conclude that
appellant’s words and actions indicated that he was not seeking spiritual advice or
counseling, but was trying to explain his side of the story.”).
111
See, e.g., In re W.B.W., No. 11–11–00269–CV, 2012 WL 2856067, at *15 (Tex. App.
July 12, 2012) (finding lack of privilege based on Pastor’s testimony that defendant “merely
began ‘popping off’ with a sexually explicit story”).
112
No. M2012-01925-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3056164, at *23–25 (Tenn. Crim. App. July
7, 2014).
113
Id. at *26.
114
Id.
115
No. M2012-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12,
2014), appeal denied (May 14, 2015).
116
Id. at *5; cf. Mitchell, supra note 49, at 748 (discussing the challenges of characterizing
spiritual counseling since “the content of counseling sessions often includes many
theoretically distinguishable types of confidential disclosure, including, for example,
statements of the confider’s past conduct, confessions, expressions of penitence, expressions
of anger and other deeply felt emotions, solicitations of advice, personal background
information, and statements about the wrongdoing of others”).
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during the conversation at issue,117 he advised the defendant to “open
up” about the murder so the defendant “could ask for forgiveness.”118
Without interrogating the pastor’s representation, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the privilege.119
This narrowing is particularly apparent when clergy perceive the
communicant is insufficiently contrite or using the clergy. In many
religions, confession requires something more than getting something
off your chest—a type of confession “plus,” so to speak.120 This “plus”
is repentance, meaning a desire to make amends or change one’s ways.
In fact, there are strong canonical reasons to consider contrition.121
Nonetheless, existing statutes have no such requirement. Yet privilege
decisions reveal repeated instances where clergy treat patently
confessional speech as nonprivileged because they perceive the
communicant is not repentant.122 Responding to clergy’s
characterizations, judicial decisions have turned on this distinction.123
For example, the Massachusetts appellate court decision in
Commonwealth v. Nutter shows clergy refusing to shield verbal
“comfort”—a category of protected communication under the privilege
117

Hancock, 2014 WL 7006969, at *5.
Id.
119
Id. at *1.
120
See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in Am., The Westminster Confession of Faith 15:3
(“Although repentance be not to be rested in, as any satisfaction for sin, or any cause of the
pardon thereof, which is the act of God’s free grace in Christ; yet it is of such necessity to all
sinners, that none may expect pardon without it.”); Pinchas H. Peli, On Repentance: In the
Thought and Oral Discourses of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik 235 (2000) (discussing the
interrelationship between confession and repentance in Orthodox Judaism).
121
This focus on repentance traces back to Jeremy Bentham, who tied repentance to the
clergy privilege: “Repentance, and consequent abstinence from further misdeeds of the like
nature; repentance, followed even by satisfaction in some shape or other, satisfaction more
or less adequate for the past: such are the well-known consequences of [clergy-penitent
communication].” Bentham, supra note 42, at 590.
122
See, e.g., Parnell v. State, 581 S.E.2d 263, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (relying on cleric
(defendant’s father’s) testimony “that he did not start ministering to his son until after he was
arrested, which was after the [confessions] were made”); State v. Cardenas, No. A13–0775,
2014 WL 1516335, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014) (“The record reflects that appellant
did not seek to repent, and Pastor Samuel testified that appellant did not seek spiritual
guidance, comfort, aid, or religious counseling. Instead, the discussions involved a family
problem . . . .”).
123
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 572 A.2d 1258, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(denying the privilege to statements not motivated by religious considerations or the search
for forgiveness).
118
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statute in the state.124 Defendant’s pastor previously provided the
defendant and his wife marital and parental counseling. During a phone
call, the defendant confessed to sexually abusing his step-daughter. The
pastor conceded the defendant was seeking “comfort” but distinguished
religious comfort from seeking sympathy.125 He opined that the
conversation “could be manipulation” given the defendant “might have
recognized that his statements were incriminating and that the defendant
might have felt a ‘need to cover [his] tracks.’”126 According to the
pastor, the defendant was looking for “someone who could bring some
influence to bear on the situation” and “act as a middle man” between
the defendant and his wife.127 Thus, the pastor concluded he could
testify—reasoning the trial and appellate court accepted.128
Between statutes dependent on clergy’s interpretations of religious
disciplines and clergy’s own line drawing, the scope of protected
communications is narrowing. This suggests a more discrete subset of
protection may achieve the “full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relationship” between cleric and communicant, thus further challenging
the need for an absolute privilege.
D. The Confidentiality Requirement
Third, statutes uniformly privilege only confidential spiritual
communications. Despite differences in black letter law, in application,
clergy testimony frequently resolves the inquiry. This testimony shows
clergy adopting restrictive definitions of confidentiality, thus
challenging the traditional justification’s “empirical assumption” that
sweeping “confidentiality is essential” to protect the clergycommunicant relationship.
Some courts focus on the communicant’s subjective expectations that
the communication is confidential.129 This approach invites self-serving
124

28 N.E.3d 1, 3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), rev. denied, 35 N.E.3d 721 (Mass. 2015).
Id. at 4.
126
Id. (alteration in original).
127
Id.
128
Id. But see State v. Gerhart, 129 S.W.3d 893, 899–900 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (denying
privilege after minister characterizes conversation with communicant about her miscarriage
as “simply a ‘Hi, how are you’ type conversation”).
129
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 21 S.W.3d 595, 598 (Tex. App. 2000), aff’d, 45 S.W.3d
101 (discussing how “appellant’s subjective intent would have been relevant” to evaluating
privilege); State v. Glenn, 62 P.3d 921, 926 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (subjective).
125

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Exorcising the Clergy Privilege

1043

statements, particular by defendant communicants asserting the
privilege.130 Aware of this, courts rely on clergy testimony as a check on
a communicant’s claims of expected confidentiality.
For example, in State v. Cardenas, a Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision, the defendant was accused of sexual assault.131 He testified that
he had a ten-year-long relationship with his pastor and sought him out to
speak privately about the wrongdoing.132 With this testimony, the
defendant’s subjective intent no longer controlled. Instead, the analysis
converted to whether the cleric would confirm or refute the
communicant’s intent.133
Other courts adopt an objective standard, requiring that
communicants have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.134 This
standard is intended to “separate[] idiosyncratic views from reasonable
ones and disregards subjective thoughts that are not conveyed.”135 Under
this approach, courts consider various factors, as set forth in Figure 7.
Figure 7

Proposed Federal Rule 506(a)(2) supports this interpretation. As the Advisory Committee
Notes explain, since confidentiality is subjective to the communicant, confidentiality is
presumed absent an intent to disclose. 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 506App.01, Advisory Committee’s Note (Mark S. Brodin
ed., 2d ed. 2016) (referencing proposed Rule 506, Communications to Clergy).
130
This construction also poses a significant barrier in criminal cases where the defendant
asserts his Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 28–29
(Mont. 1998) (“Because MacKinnon did not testify, there is no evidence as to his motives
for engaging in the conversation nor any evidence as to his state of mind or his expectations
of confidentiality.”).
131
No. A13–0775, 2014 WL 1516335, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2014).
132
Id. at *4.
133
Id. at *4–5.
134
See, e.g., State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 8 (Conn. 2011) (“In evaluating claims of
privilege, we assess the confidentiality of a communication according to a standard of
objective reasonableness.”); State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1131 (N.J. 2010) (“We agree that
the test should be an objective one.”); State v. List, 636 A.2d 1054, 1057 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1993) (finding defendant’s letter to his pastor, “left for anyone to find and read” in
unsealed file folder in a file cabinet in defendant’s abandoned house, was not made with “a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality”); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d
374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding privilege only protects persons “who reasonably expect that
their words will be kept in confidence”).
135
J.G., 990 A.2d at 1131.
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These factors include whether the cleric and communicant met in
private, the nature of their relationship, the type of information shared,
and any promises of confidentiality.136 While clergy actively preserve
confidentiality in some cases,137 their conduct and testimony more
frequently generate new, more restrictive interpretations of
confidentiality.
For example, rather than actively helping “people handle their
anxieties, guilts, fears, rages, doubts, and despairs,”138 some clergy are
setting boundaries that limit such disclosures. This includes meeting
with individuals in public places,139 conducting meetings with office
doors left open,140 bringing third parties to meetings with potential
communicants,141 or otherwise discouraging a communication.142 Often,
136
See, e.g., Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 615 (D. Utah 1990) (considering who
initiated the meeting and the location of the meeting); State v. MacKinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 28–
29 (Mont. 1998) (considering representations of confidentiality, who attended, lack of
promised confidentiality, and the location of the meeting); J.G., 990 A.2d at 1133–34
(considering the nature of the relationship between the cleric and the penitent, and the fact
that the pastor and defendant met in private).
137
Clergy are more protective of jail or hospital communications than courts. However,
the trend is to deny the privilege to communications where, even for reasons outside the
communicants’ control, an expectation of confidentiality is unrealistic. In such settings, the
finding of privilege post 2000 drops to one out of eight cases. See, e.g., State v. Gardiner,
898 P.2d 615, 619 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (finding discussion with hospital chaplain not
confidential because hospital staff could enter the room where communications occurred).
That said, some jurisdictions, like Texas, recognize these challenges and thus minimize this
requirement in such settings, requiring only that the parties attempt to keep the
communication as confidential as possible given these obstacles to true privacy. See, e.g.,
Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. App. 1992) (“It is difficult to conceptualize
a hospital setting that affords complete privacy to a chaplain and a communicant in
circumstances where a family member is undergoing surgery. Common experience tells us
that, more often than not, the chaplain will be assisting the family by affording company and
comfort in the waiting room of a surgical suite, recovery room, or intensive care unit.”).
138
Ronald Goldfarb, In Confidence: When to Protect Secrecy and When to Require
Disclosure 124–25 (2009).
139
See People v. Peterson, 47 N.E.3d 1005, 1053 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), reh’g denied (Dec.
16, 2015), appeal allowed, 48 N.E.3d 1095 (Ill. 2016); MacKinnon, 957 P.2d at 28.
140
See, e.g., State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 6 (Conn. 2011) (open door); State v. Beloved,
No. 14–1796, 2015 WL 8390222, at *2, *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (open door).
141
See, e.g., State v. Pulley, 636 S.E.2d 231, 241 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing how
cleric intentionally brought other ministers and a church elder to meeting with
communicant).
142
See, e.g., Cartmell, 2014 WL 3056164, at *24 (discussing chaplain telling defendant
that “he did not need to tell him what happened”).
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clergy urge the communicant to go to the police and share the
communication.143 In some instances, they go further, directly telling
communicants early in conversations that they will not maintain a
communicant’s confidences.144 Alternatively, some negate a potential
privilege by repeating the communication to another person.145
At trial, clergy’s conduct continues to limit when a communicant has
a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Clergy have testified despite
previous promises to maintain the communicant’s confidentiality.146 As
courts permit such testimony, it greatly narrows the concept of objective
confidentiality. A communicant cannot rely on clerical representations
of confidentiality to establish this required element.147
Where clergy testimony is particularly pivotal, though, is in
jurisdictions that consider religious doctrine to evaluate
confidentiality.148 For these courts, a communication is objectively
143
See, e.g., Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63, 66 (Tex. App. 2001) (discussing how Pastor
and elders repeatedly urged defendant to confess).
144
See, e.g., Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-001870-MR, 2014 WL 2159281, at
*1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 23, 2014) (involving a cleric telling defendant to “stop right there. I’m
a minister, and I’m a mother first, and I don’t want to hear anymore of this”); State v.
Hancock, No. M2012-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 12, 2014), appeal denied (May 14, 2015) (noting clergy “made it clear to the defendant
during these conversations that his paramount concern was locating the victim and that he
intended to share with the police anything the defendant revealed regarding the victim’s
disappearance”).
145
See, e.g., State v. Gray, 891 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. 2005) (finding conversation not
confidential because communicant failed to object to minister calling another pastor for
assistance).
146
See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (telling
communicant conversation would be confidential but then requiring disclosure to provide
guidance); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“Notwithstanding
the prior assurances [of confidentiality], the minister divulged to deacons of the church and
members of the community the confidential communications from the family, and without
their authority.”).
147
Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1158–59 (Mass. 2009) (“At the
beginning of the meeting, Pastor Ralph announced ‘rules’ for the meeting, including that any
discussion at the meeting would remain confidential,” though at trial the pastor willingly
testified.); Commonwealth v. Vital, 988 N.E.2d 866, 869–70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“Before
disclosing the details of the incident, the defendant first asked the pastor whether he would
have to testify against the defendant if a case were to ever proceed to trial. The pastor replied
that he did not think that he would have to testify,” but the pastor proceeded to testify at
trial.).
148
See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.260(3) (2015) (preventing the examination of a clergy
member “as to any confidential communication made to the member in the member’s
professional character, if, under the discipline or tenets of the member’s church,
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confidential once clergy identify some canonical basis to shield it.149
This approach is similar to the “discipline-enjoined” restriction courts
apply to the spiritual communications requirement and is equally
problematic for confidentiality. Religious doctrine—particularly for the
many Protestant religions that dominate the American religious
landscape—is frequently inconclusive on these confidentiality queries.
Thus, different clergy’s interpretations generate conflicting
conclusions—thus challenging how essential confidentiality is.
For example, consider two Michigan cases involving communications
with Baptist ministers. Both involved allegations of criminal sexual
misconduct.150 In both, the ministers learned of the abuse and spoke to
the defendants in the private setting of their offices.151 In both, the
defendants admitted their wrongdoing, and the clergy reported the abuse
to the police.152 The courts splintered on whether the communications
were privileged, though, based on conflicting representations by the
clergy regarding confidentiality.153 In one, the cleric testified that under
Baptist doctrine, the communication was confidential.154 In the other, the
pastor stated, “under Baptist doctrine, the circumstances of his meeting

denomination or organization, the member has an absolute duty to keep the communication
confidential”).
149
See, e.g., State v. Billman, No. 12 MO 3, 2013 WL 6859096, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 16, 2013) (relying on Pastor’s representations regarding canonical teaching to evaluate
confidentiality); State v. Cox, 742 P.2d 694, 696 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (“[Minister] also
testified that, as a Mormon minister, he had a duty under the discipline of the church not to
disclose confidential communications made to him.”).
150
Compare People v. Richard, No. 315267, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
June 24, 2014), with People v. Bragg, 824 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
151
Compare Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *4 (discussing setting of conversation), with
Bragg, 824 N.W.2d at 175 (discussing setting of conversation).
152
Compare Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1 (reporting to police), with Bragg, 824
N.W.2d at 187 (reporting to police).
153
Compare Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *6 (finding communications were not
privileged because “under Baptist doctrine, the circumstances of [the pastor’s] meeting with
defendant did not trigger . . . confidentiality”), with Bragg, 824 N.W.2d at 187 (finding
communications were privileged because pastor “testified that under Baptist doctrine his
communication with defendant would have been considered confidential”).
154
Bragg, 824 N.W.2d at 176 (“The prosecutor inquired, ‘[U]nder the Baptist doctrine,
under your church rules, would this communication that you had with him, and the nature
how the communication came about, would that be . . . considered a confidential
communication?’ [Pastor] Vaprezsan responded, ‘I’m sure it would.’” (alteration in
original)).
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with defendant did not trigger that confidentiality” because the
conversation involved abuse.155
As courts rely on clergy testimony to decide confidentiality, other
fractures appear in the assumption that absolute confidentiality is
essential to the clergy-communicant relationship. Notably, clergy are
less likely to characterize communications regarding violent crimes as
confidential.156 This directly contributes to a higher rate of privilege
denials in such cases.157
For example, the Alabama Court of Appeals in Tankersley v. State
relied on clergy testimony to hold a communicant must affirmatively
request confidentiality.158 There, the defendant called his pastor and
discussed his desire to kill his ex-girlfriend. The pastor had spiritually
counseled the defendant repeatedly in the past.159 At the subsequent
murder trial, the pastor refuted the communicant’s claim of
confidentiality. Rather than push for a protective definition of
confidentiality, the pastor argued for carve-outs. She maintained the
conversation was not confidential because “not one time did [defendant]
say, I am talking to you as a pastor or this is a confidential
conversation.”160 The pastor maintained she owed no obligation of
confidence for threats of violence—a position not supported by the state
privilege statute. Nonetheless, the trial court adopted the pastor’s
restrictions, which the appellate court affirmed by finding a lack of
privilege.161
Thus, through both pretrial conduct and litigation testimony, clergy
challenge the necessity—from a cleric’s perspective—of an absolute
privilege. Though they continue to shield confidential, spiritual
communications received in their professional capacity, clergy’s
155

Richard, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1–2, 6.
This is true even of communications made in otherwise confidential spiritual
counseling. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 101, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(involving the disclosure communication between a Pastor and the appellant, whom the
pastor was counseling because the appellant did not care about the pastor’s ability to keep
secrets).
157
Denial rate in violent crimes cases is 72.22%. See Bartholomew Clergy Data, supra
note 54.
158
724 So.2d 557, 561–62 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
159
In fact, as the trial court noted, “The evidence indicated that [the defendant] had always
called Pastor Henderson for spiritual guidance during times of distress.” Id. at 561.
160
Id. at 560.
161
Id. at 562, 566.
156
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definition of qualifying conversations is narrower than existing statutory
protection. These trends, however, only partially untangle the twisted
history of privilege’s decline. Why courts rely on clergy testimony and
why clergy testify contribute to the narrative. As the next Part explains,
these answers challenge whether an absolute clergy privilege is even
necessary—let alone realistic.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE HOW AND WHY
By their own words and conduct, clergy defy the traditional
justification for absolute clergy privilege statutes. Rather than a
relationship that should always be “sedulously fostered,”162
jurisprudence shows clergy drawing ad hoc boundaries with
communicants. Rather than treating confidentiality as “essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance” of those relationships,163 clergy
willingly testify on a case-by-case basis. These cases only partially
explain the privilege’s decline. This Part steps back to explore the
factors that merged to give clergy significant say in privilege
determinations. This Part then considers why clergy embrace a more
qualified privilege. Combined, the following two Sections help explain
the findings in Part II.
A. How Clergy Testimony Became Pivotal
Legislative and judicial dogmatic adherence to an absolute privilege
has contributed to its decline. Sweeping statutory protection has pushed
clergy to act as quasi-legislators, articulating boundaries that reflect
canonical and judicial ends. Similarly, courts approach privilege
determinations with increased judicial skepticism yet concurrently insist
on maintaining an absolute privilege. This, too, foists responsibility to
define the privilege on clergy, as discussed next.
1. How Legislative Imprecision Opened the Door
First, the inexactitude of state statutes triggers increased judicial
reliance on clergy testimony for privilege determinations. The majority
of state statutes adopt the same opaque language from the original New
162
163

8 Wigmore, supra note 42, § 2285.
Id.
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York statute.164 Legislators have done little to decode some of the
generic requirements from the initial statute.
For example, take Iowa’s basic requirement that clergy be “the
minister of the gospel.”165 This requirement necessarily turns on
religious doctrine. As one court explains:
What is a “minister of the gospel” within the meaning of [Iowa Code,
Section 622.10]? The law as such sets up no standard or criterion.
That question is left wholly to the recognition of the “denomination.”
The word “minister,” which in its original sense meant a mere servant,
has grown in many directions and into much dignity. Few English
words have a more varied meaning. In the religious world it is often, if
not generally, used as referring to a pastor of the church and a
preacher of the gospel. This meaning, however, is not applicable to all
Christian denominations. Some of them have no pastors and recognize
no one as a minister in that sense, and yet all denominations recognize
the spiritual authority of the church and provide a source
of spiritual advice and discipline.166

Similarly, defining “confessions” pushes courts to consider clergy
testimony. Courts could require disclosure of the entirety of the
communication and make their own evaluation about whether it is a
confession. However, doing so conflicts with the notion of a testimonial

164
Compare, e.g., N.Y. Rev. Stat. § 72, pt. III, ch. VII, tit. 3, art. 8 (1829) (since amended)
(“No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to
disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of
discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.”), with Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-4062 (2010) (“A clergyman or priest, without consent of the person making the
confession, as to any confession made to the clergyman or priest in his professional character
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the clergyman or priest
belongs.”), and Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015) (“A member of the clergy or priest may
not, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any
confession made to the individual in the individual’s professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the individual belongs.”).
165
See Iowa Code Ann. § 4608 (1913) (since amended). Iowa subsequently revised its
privilege to cover communications with equally undefined “member of the clergy.” Iowa
Code § 622.10 (2017).
166
Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 292 (Iowa 1917).
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privilege: parties would still have to disclose the confidence.167 Faced
with this conundrum, courts instead adopt clergy’s labeling.
Legislators’ efforts to expand clergy privilege statutes increase clergy
influence. For example, as previously detailed in Subsection II.B.2,
rather than first locking down the definition of confession, legislators in
most states increased the categories of protected communications.168
These new categories are equally imprecise. Take, for example, state
statutes that protect communications offering “comfort.”169 Such a broad
term necessitates further judicial interpretation: are the contents of
prayer between clergy and communicants covered? What about
blessings during times of crisis: are they “comfort?” Should it matter
who initiates the conversation?
In rare instances, state legislators have attempted to remedy these
vague requirements. The results, however, only further complicate
interpretation. For example, fifteen states impose the previously
discussed “discipline-enjoined” requirement.170 “Discipline,” though, is
hardly self-defining.171 As the Minnesota Supreme Court explains, “The
167

Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that courts
must consider delicate first amendment issues when conducting in camera hearings to
determine whether communications are privileged).
168
See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 34-46-3-1(3) (LexisNexis 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233,
§ 20A (2016); Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A–23 (West 2011)
(amended in 1994 to include “privileged communications” such as confessions, counseling,
and other communications); Utah R. Evid. 503 n.(b) (amended to extend the privilege
beyond “doctrinally required confessions”).
169
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-166 (2012) (applying privilege to person communicating
“(1) to make a confession, (2) to seek spiritual counsel or comfort, or (3) to enlist help or
advice in connection with a marital problem”); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-5-502 (2013) (protecting
“[e]very communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual
comfort, or seeking counseling”); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2016) (protecting “any
communication made to him by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or
comfort, or as to his advice”); Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (2016) (protecting “religious or spiritual
advice, aid, or comfort or advice”).
170
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2233 (2016); Cal. Evid. Code § 1032 (Deering 2004);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107 (2017); D.C. Code § 14-309 (2001); Fla. Stat. § 90.505 (2016);
Idaho Code § 9-203 (2010); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-803 (2016); Mich. Comp. Laws
Serv. § 600.2156 (2004); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-804 (2015); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 40.260 (2015); 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-206 (2000);
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137 (LexisNexis 2012); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-400 (2015); Wash.
Rev. Code § 5.60.060 (2016); W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-9 (LexisNexis 2012); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 1-12-101 (2017).
171
See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 13, at 1640–44 (discussing judicial splits in interpreting
the “discipline enjoined” requirement).
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word ‘discipline’ has various meanings. It may relate to education. It
involves training and culture. It may mean training in moral rectitude,
and it was probably in part so used here. It may refer to rules and duties.
The word has no technical legal meaning . . . .” 172 Or, as Professor Mary
Mitchell more colorfully explains, “Such sloppy drafting leaves
unanswered the question of the privilege’s application to most
confidential communications to most clergy! Few churches require their
members to make private confessions to clergy; probably none require
their members to seek counseling.”173 While courts adopt conflicting
interpretations to this “discipline-enjoined” requirement,174 clergy keep
chipping away against legislative efforts to broaden protection. In doing
so, clergy are not acting with malice or indifference to the
communicants. Rather, the cases highlight clergy discomfort with an
absolute privilege.
Imprecise terms, alone, are not necessarily problematic. As Judge
Ruggero Aldisert explains: “Case-by-case development allows
experimentation because each rule is re-evaluated in subsequent cases to
determine whether it produces a fair result. If it operates unfairly, it can
be modified.”175 Rather, the point here is that legislators have failed to
revisit the privilege in response to clergy’s case-by-case approach.176
This leaves courts to balance potentially wide-reaching statutory
172

In re Swenson, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (Minn. 1931).
Mitchell, supra note 49, at 754.
174
In the face of this ambiguity, some courts ignore the “discipline-enjoined” requirement,
others wade into murky religious doctrine, and still others impose it to construe both the
“communication” and “confidentiality” requirements. Compare, e.g., Nussbaumer v. State,
882 So. 2d 1067, 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (merging “discipline-enjoined” and
professional capacity requirements), and Swenson, 237 N.W. at 591 (same), with, e.g., State
v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1999) (defining the state’s “discipline enjoined”
requirement as clergy’s doctrinal obligations to hear a confidence), and People v. Johnson,
75 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (same), and Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947,
955–56 (Utah 1994) (considering the “discipline of [the clergy’s] church” to evaluate
whether a nonpenitential communication was privileged), and Ball v. State, 419 N.E.2d 137,
139–40 (Ind. 1981) (permitting testimony of Baptist minister regarding parishioner’s
admission to murders because constitution of church did not require pastoral confession, or
confidential pastor-parishioner discussion with respect to crime), and People v. Richard, No.
315267, 2014 WL 2881081, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 24, 2014) (considering religious
practices for both confidentiality and communication requirements), and State v. Billman,
No. 12 MO 3, 2013 WL 6859096, at *13–14 (Oh. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013) (same).
175
Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Honorable Ralph Cappy: Distinguished Keeper of the King’s
Bench Tradition, 47 Duq. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2009).
176
See supra Part II.
173
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protection against their obligation to interpret privileges narrowly. This
impossible tightrope act leaves courts relying on clergy testimony to
reach more restrained privilege determinations.
2. How the Judiciary Began Deferring to Clergy
The lack of legislative guidance is but one source of judicial reliance
on clergy in privilege determinations. A change in how ardently courts
interrogate the privilege also creates room for greater clergy influence.
For over a century, most courts only loosely examined clergy
privilege assertions. A decision may address a single requirement or
generically recite the requirements with little analysis.177 However, the
growth of clergy privilege assertions in the late 1980s brought a
corresponding greater scrutiny of the privilege’s requirements. Rather

177
For example, in Milburn v. Haworth, the Supreme Court of Colorado subjected the
defendant’s clergy privilege assertion to minimal scrutiny, simply stating:
The statements made by the defendant to his fellow churchmen, including the
minister, were not made to the minister in his professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the particular church. . . . The statements were made in the
same manner that they would have been made to any other four gentlemen whom the
defendant might call together.
108 P. 155, 156 (Colo. 1910). The court did not address any of the criteria for the
requirement in depth nor attempt to detail how it reached its conclusion. This hands-off,
deferential approach continues today in Washington and Oregon, where courts only loosely
question a clergy privilege challenge. For example, in most other states, courts trend towards
refusing the privilege in cases of child abuse. See, e.g., State v. Latham, No. E2006-02262CCA-R3CD, 2008 WL 748381, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2008) (finding
communication by defendant accused of aggravated child abuse not privileged because the
chaplain was merely a bystander); Maldonado v. State, 59 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App.
2001) (finding communication by defendant accused of indecency with a child to a bishop
not privileged because the bishop was not acting in his professional character as a spiritual
advisor). In Oregon and Washington, though, the trend is the opposite. See, e.g., State v.
Cox, 742 P.2d 694, 696–97 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (finding defendant’s confession of sexual
intercourse with his step-daughter privileged based on cleric’s promise of confidentiality,
despite defendant’s testimony that “he did not want [the clergy] to withhold any testimony”);
“Jane Doe” v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 90 P.3d
1147, 1151–52 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (accepting church’s statement that all disciplinary
investigations are confidential, thus finding defendant’s communications regarding
allegations of abuse to eighteen church council members privileged despite lack of finding
the participants were clergy); State v. Glenn, 62 P.3d 921, 925–27 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding communication by defendant accused of child molestation and rape to his church
elder privileged despite the church’s lack of a “doctrine of confession” and the clergy’s
statement that he did not consider defendant’s communication a confession).
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than accepting wholesale assertions of privilege, courts began
scrutinizing them more closely, evaluating each requirement at length.178
This increased scrutiny, particularly of the confidentiality
requirement, is not isolated. The judiciary has already narrowed privacy
rights in both intellectual property179 and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.180 This same trend is now evident in the clergy privilege;
though in this context, this skepticism has other roots as well. Though it
would be overreaching to draw a causal connection, the timing of both
the 1980s televangelist scandals181 and the more recent clergy abuse
scandals suggests it would be naïve to ignore their impact. As illustrated
in Figure 8, a wave of clergy privilege denials followed the televangelist
scandals and a corresponding drop in Americans’ confidence in
organized religion.182 A second wave of denials followed in 2002, when
societal confidence began a free fall from which it has yet to recover.183
178

See, e.g., People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(analyzing multiple statutory requirements before denying privilege); Richard, 2014 WL
2881081, at *3–6 (analyzing each statutory requirement). This is not universal though. See,
e.g., Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-001870-MR, 2014 WL 2159281, at *2 (Ky. Ct.
App. May 23, 2014) (analyzing only communication requirement); Lundman v. McKown,
530 N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (same).
179
See, e.g., Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital
Age 82–83 (2015) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence narrowing privacy rights).
180
See, e.g., Schuyler B. Sorosky, United States v. Forrester: An Unwarranted Narrowing
of the Fourth Amendment, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1121, 1137 (2008). See generally Albert W.
Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 16–17
(1983) (detailing the Supreme Court’s narrowing of Fourth Amendment standing).
181
Three then-prominent televangelists had scandals in the late 1980s: Jimmy Baker, Pat
Robinson, and Jimmy Swaggart. First, in 1987, Baker admitted to having an affair and
paying his secretary, Jessica Hahn, to conceal a sexual encounter. The next year, he was
indicted for fleecing his congregation of $150 million. He was convicted in 1989.
Meanwhile, in 1987, Pat Robertson admitted to lying about his marriage to conceal the
premarital conception of a child. Then, Jimmy Swaggart, another televangelist whose
ministry was broadcasted on more than 250 television stations, was implicated in two
scandals with prostitutes after Swaggart exposed a fellow minister of adultery. Swaggart’s
transgressions culminated with a famous speech in February 1988, during which he
confessed. Ann Rowe Seaman, Swaggart: The Unauthorized Biography of an American
Evangelist 341 (1999).
182
Jeffrey M. Jones, Confidence in U.S. Institutions Still Below Historical Norms, Gallup
Org. (June 15, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183593/confidence-institutions-belowhistorical-norms.aspx (noting a 13% decline in confidence in churches and religious
institutions in 2015 compared to historical averages).
183
Mark Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends 79 (2013) (analogizing the
drop comparable “in magnitude to the sudden drop in confidence in banks and financial
institutions caused by the 2008 global financial crisis”).
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Notably, 2002 marked the publication of the Boston Globe report of the
clergy abuse scandals—reporting that began a “firestorm of negative
publicity” for religious institutions.184
Figure 8

As confidence dropped, judicial interrogation of privilege assertions
deepened. The response to the clergy abuse by some religious
institutions only fueled judicial skepticism. Rather than mirroring the
general trend of clergy narrowly interpreting the privilege, in the church
sex abuse cases, clergy uniformly pushed for blanket protection.185 Many
churches raised clergy privilege objections to shield communications by
alleged clergy perpetrators to their superiors186 and fellow priests.187
These cases reflect a self-interested interpretation of the privilege, where
184

Id.
See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 216, 231
(Ct. App. 2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 16, 2005) (discussing how appellant
Archbishop improperly asserted blanket privilege assertions for twenty-two document
requests); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 311–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (reflecting
monsignor’s refusal to produce any of the requested documents in clergy abuse case).
186
See, e.g., Ex parte Zoghby, 958 So. 2d 314, 325 (Ala. 2006) (evaluating clergy
privilege assertion over defendant priest’s communications to his Archbishop); Campobello,
810 N.E.2d at 311 (deciding whether clergy privilege applied to priest’s records maintained
by his monsignor); Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (evaluating
defendant priest’s communications in church’s “secret archive”).
187
Kos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 633, 638–40 (Tex. App. 2000) (addressing priest’s assertion of
privilege regarding communications to a fellow priest).
185
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clergy claimed virtually every document between a cleric and superior
was privileged.188
While this absolutist approach appears across denominations in
church sex abuse cases,189 the Roman Catholic church, most notably, has
urged broader privilege coverage, even when a priest is the victim in a
case. For example, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, the defendant was
charged with murdering a priest.190 As part of his defense, he asserted
self-defense and sought production records regarding the priest’s alleged
alcohol and drug use; any allegations of misconduct or disciplinary
action; and all personal records, correspondence, diaries, or similar
documents maintained by the Reverend.191 The Church refused to
produce any of these materials in whole or part, asserting clergy
privilege. The trial court rejected such a sweeping interpretation, noting
“it is clear that the [clergy privilege] statute does not provide blanket
protection for all documents in the hands of the Diocese simply because
of the Diocese’s status as a religious organization.”192
It may not be surprising that skepticism towards religious institutions
impacts judicial willingness to shield religious communications. With
188

For example, in Hutchison v. Luddy, the plaintiff, an alleged victim of sexual assault by
Father Luddy, sought discovery of three categories of documents, all of which were related
to the Church’s investigation of wrongdoing:
(1) documents in the Canon 489 file which in any way pertain to Father Francis
Luddy, for the years 1974 through the present. (Request for Production No. 27).
(2) documents in the Canon 489 file which pertain to any alleged and/or actual reports
of sexual involvement with minor male children by priests in the Altoona–Johnstown
Diocese, for the years 1974 through the present. (Request for Production No. 28).
(3) documents in the Canon 489 file relating to a specifically named priest. (First
Supplemental Request for Production No. 9).
606 A.2d at 906. The defendants categorically refused, providing blanket assertions of
privilege, which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania subsequently denied for failure to
establish how the privilege applied to each document. Id.
189
State v. Dotseth, 766 N.W.2d 648, 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (asserting privilege in
Church of One abuse case); Vermilye v. State, 754 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)
(claiming privilege in Episcopalian priest abuse scandal). This self-protecting interpretation
applies even when the cleric is the victim, not the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 196–97, 200–01 (Pa. 1997) (noting in case involving murder of
priest wherein defendant sought victim’s personnel records where it is unclear whether the
requested information is within the privilege, an in camera review of the documents is
appropriate).
190
647 A.2d 597, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
191
Id. at 599.
192
Id. at 601.
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clergy pushing for blanket privileges in child abuse cases, courts
responded with across-the-board increased scrutiny of clergy privilege
assertions193—even in non-abuse cases.194 What is a bit surprising,
though, is the judicial decision to embrace clergy testimony, rather than
shy away from it.195 This is particularly surprising given confidence in
religious leaders has declined at a faster rate than for leaders of any
other institutions.196 Given the problems with the statutory language
previously detailed,197 courts have had little choice but to depend on the
clergy to shape the privilege. Judicial reliance on court-appointed
experts or other neutral sources is problematic. Such an approach
requires courts to undertake independent fact finding as courts weigh
competing religious testimony to interpret canonical law. As one court
explains the problem, “civil judges attempting to apply such a test would
first have to identify and define the specific religious tenets of a
particular religion, which may not always be readily apparent.”198
Further, identifying neutral experts is difficult, given how prevalent

193
For example, in clergy abuse cases, courts increasingly rely on in camera reviews to
evaluate such assertions. See, e.g., Hethcote v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diosean Corp., No.
X04CV054003450S, 2007 WL 1121361, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2007) (applying in
camera review); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (same).
194
A comparison of two Massachusetts appeals, just over two decades apart, shows this
trend towards increased scrutiny of clergy privilege assertions. Compare Commonwealth v.
Nutter, 28 N.E.3d 1, 4, review denied, 35 N.E.3d 721 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (affirming the
denial of clergy privilege in a child abuse case after exploring the relationship between the
clergy and communicant and the content of the communication at issue), with Ryan v. Ryan,
642 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (Mass. 1994) (affirming granting of privilege in annulment case by
assuming the communication “may well have literally involved ‘seeking religious or
spiritual advice or comfort’”).
195
The argument here is not that courts suddenly began relying on clergy testimony.
Rather, from inception, clergy privilege cases often turned on clergy testimony. See, e.g.,
People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (“An objection was made to the
proof of certain admissions made by the defendant, on the ground that they were confessions
made to a clergyman. The answer to this objection is found in the testimony of Dr. Ludlow,
that he did not consider the communication made to him in his professional character, or as a
clergyman.”). Increased judicial scrutiny generated greater reliance on clergy testimony.
196
Chaves, supra note 183, at 79.
197
See supra Subsection III.A.1.
198
State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1132 (N.J. 2010).
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different canonical interpretations are.199 To minimize this questionable
judicial religious entanglement,200 courts turn to the clergy witness.
This reliance perpetuates continued reliance on clergy testimony by
stunting the development of common law interpretations of the
privilege’s requirements. By relying on clergy testimony, trial courts are
making factual, not legal findings. These fact findings are subject to
abuse of discretion review.201 This limits appellate review, where
reversal is limited to “arbitrary, irrational, capricious, whimsical,
fanciful, or unreasonable” decisions.202 Unlike the de novo review
afforded to questions of law, this extreme deference limits appellate
199

See supra Section II.D.
Judicial interpretation of religious doctrine walks a fine constitutional line. Under the
Establishment Clause, government activity (including conduct by the judiciary) must not
foster excessive entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971) (setting forth a three-part test for Establishment Clause claims and including
excessive entanglement as the third prong). By turning to religious doctrine to identify
religiously necessary or confidential communications, courts must delve into questions of
doctrine and faith—the very intertwining prohibited under the Establishment Clause. See
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
450 (1969) (noting civil courts may not “determine matters at the very core of religion—the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the
religion”); Jane E. Mayes, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes:
Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 Ind. L.J. 397, 408 (1987) (discussing how
“religious confidentiality statute[s] launch[] state investigations into religious doctrines and
provide[] for government surveillance of religious institutions, [which] leaves the state and
religion closely intertwined, a result forbidden by the establishment clause”); cf. Klagsbrun
v. Va’ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 739–42 (D.N.J. 1999)
(dismissing defamation claim because “questions of religious doctrine permeate” complaint
and resolving claim would “delve dangerously into questions of doctrine and faith”), aff’d
o.b., 263 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2001); Abdelhak v. Jewish Press, 985 A.2d 197, 200 (N.J. App.
Div. 2009) (dismissing defamation claim that would invite excessive entanglement contrary
to First Amendment, because jury could not evaluate claim “without developing a keen
understanding of religious doctrine, and without applying such religious doctrine to the facts
presented”).
201
See, e.g., State v. Archibeque, 221 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (where the
court applies a three-pronged factual determination to decide the application of privilege);
People v. Trammell, 345 P.3d 945, 947–48 (Colo. App. 2014), ¶10, cert. denied, No.
14SC335, 2015 WL 1205596 (Colo. Mar. 16, 2015) (“We will not disturb a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.”); accord Nicholson v.
Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. App. 1992) (reviewing trial court’s finding of privilege
using an abuse of discretion standard); State v. Glenn, 62 P.3d 921, 924 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (reviewing trial court’s finding of privilege using an abuse of discretion standard).
202
Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the
Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 531,
533 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200
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courts from articulating clear, consistent guidelines to evaluate privilege
determinations.203 It also sacrifices the more cerebral and academic
understanding of testimony that usually accompanies appellate
decisions.204
Judicial reliance on clergy testimony only increases as courts issue
unpublished or otherwise unciteable decision designations.205 In
California alone, more than one-third of clergy privilege cases are
unpublished.206 These unpublished opinions hinder the growth of a
“coherent, consistent and intelligible body of case law.”207 When one
court interprets a particular clergy privilege requirement in an

203

See Robert L. Hess II, Judges Cooperating with Scientists: A Proposal for More
Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge’s Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors,
54 Vand. L. Rev. 547, 586 (2001) (noting “the efficacy of mere abuse of discretion review is
doubtful”). This problem with deferential evidentiary standards of abuse is not limited to the
clergy privilege. See, e.g., Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued
Attack on Private Antitrust, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 2147, 2179–80 (2014) (discussing how a
deferential abuse of discretion review hinders evaluation of economic expert testimony);
Amy B. Hargis & Joe R. Patranella, Rethinking Review: The Increasing Need for a Practical
Standard of Review on Daubert Issues in Place of Joiner, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 409, 417 (2011)
(arguing that trial courts evaluate economic expert testimony subjectively).
204
See L. Steven Emmert, Appellate Law, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 169, 180 (2010); Jonah J.
Horwitz, Social Insecurity: A Modest Proposal for Remedying Federal District Court
Inconsistency in Social Security Cases, 34 Pace L. Rev. 30, 56 (2014) (discussing the
appellate court’s “capacity for attracting cerebral jurists”).
205
See, e.g., State v. Gil, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0508, 2014 WL 4725805, at *1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Sept. 23, 2014); Candice S. v. Superior Court, No. H032683, 2008 WL 3274099, at *4
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2008); Hethcote v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diosean Corp., No.
X04CV054003450S, 2007 WL 1121361, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2007); People v.
Pearson, No. 305957, 2012 WL 2919543, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2012); State v.
Schauer, No. A13-0500, 2014 WL 6608790, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014); EMC,
LLC v. Cooper, No. A-0948-10T4, 2012 WL 5381688, at *10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Nov. 5, 2012); Jackson v. Futrell, No. M1999-01046-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 279900, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2000); State v. Huffman, No. 50937–3–1, 120 Wash. App. 1038,
(2004).
206
See Bartholomew Clergy Data, supra note 54; Jennifer K. Anderson, Comment, The
Minnesota Court of Appeals: A Court Without Precedent?, 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 743,
760–63 (1993) (discussing how a lack of published opinions makes it difficult to know to
evaluate the current state of the law); see also People v. Rodriguez, No. G046114, 2012 WL
5992130 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012); People v. Hoffman, No. F061127, 2012 WL
2583404 (Cal. Ct. App. July 5, 2012), as modified on denial of reh’g (July 30, 2012);
Candice S., 2008 WL 3274099; People v. Camacho, No. E037402, 2006 WL 3445491 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006).
207
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001).
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unpublished opinion, another court cannot rely on that decision.208
Instead, the court reanalyzes the requirement anew,209 with judges again
turning to clergy to make fact-specific findings.210
Thus, increased judicial scrutiny of privilege assertions has solicited
more clergy testimony. This testimony, in turn, undermines the
traditional justification for an absolute privilege. That said, more clergy
testimony did not have to diminish the privilege’s application: clergy
could have maintained the same absolutist approach adopted in the
church abuse scandal cases. However, they have not. The next Section
explores why.
B. Why Clergy Resist the Privilege
As mentioned in Part I, when posed with a hypothetical scenario,
clergy responses indicate genuine intentions to maintain confidences.211
As Part II details, however, clergy repeatedly cast testimony as outside
the privilege.212 Thus, the question of why clergy testify explores the gap
between clergy’s desires and actual practices. This exploration
208
See, e.g., Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44
Willamette L. Rev. 723, 750 (2008); Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A
Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 Geo. L.J. 621, 647 (2009) (noting that
“[courts] may subsequently depart from the rules or holdings in those prior unpublished
opinions”).
209
See David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 61, 169 (2009) (describing a
survey in which judges attributed unsettled jurisprudence, in part, to unpublished opinions);
Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A
Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81
Wash. L. Rev. 217, 228 (2006) (discussing how nonprecedential dispositions hinder decision
making).
210
Federal clergy privilege decisions are limited but similarly encourage greater reliance
on clergy testimony. The most exhaustive circuit court treatment of the privilege is In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377–78 (3d Cir. 1990). There, a Lutheran minister
jointly counseled the defendant, his fiancée, and his parents. The defendant, Shaw, was
suspected of racially motivated arson of his neighbor’s home. Shaw occasionally attended
church, while his parents were active members. At trial, the pastor maintained that all
attendants of the counseling sessions were essential for effective counseling and expected
such communications be kept strictly confidential. The Third Circuit remanded the trial
court’s denial of the privilege. The Court directed the lower courts to inquire into the nature
of the communicants’ relationship as well as the pastoral counseling practices of the relevant
synod of the Lutheran church. Id. at 387–88. Clergy testimony is central to such inquiries.
211
See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
212
See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
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necessarily traverses the terrain of supposition: individual clerics may
have unknowable reasons for testifying in a given case.
Given this caveat, this Section offers a potential explanation of
clergy’s conduct in privilege cases. In the absence of religious guidance
and standardized professional codes of conduct, clergy—consciously or
otherwise—weigh the importance of testifying.213 Under the traditional
justification, the clergy privilege is absolute, in part because of a
presumption that “[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication [is] greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.”214 Clergy privilege statutes
treat confidentiality as an isolated duty. Once confidential information is
shared, privilege statutes assume a cloak of silence drapes the
communication, not to be lifted by the courts.215 Hence, underlying the
privilege is an unstated assumption that for clergy, too, confidentiality is
paramount.
This premise ignores clergy’s competing duties. As one cleric
explains, clergy serve multiple constituents:
[Clergy] are citizens under the laws of their own society; they also
have responsibilities to individual members of their families and to
their neighbors. As people of broad moral outlook, many clergy feel
an accountability to the wider human community. They are
accountable to their denominational leadership and denominational
policy. They also have an answerability to God as they understand
God. Within their congregations, clergy must assume the difficult and
sometimes contradictory roles of administrator, preacher, counselor,

213

Cf. William W. Rankin, Confidentiality and Clergy: Churches, Ethics, and the Law 10
(1990) (“The clergy person assuredly does not assume the same stance in every situation;
rather the clergy person chooses a particular stance, based on his or her reading of that given
situation. He or she interprets the situation in order to respond appropriately to the need or
concern, and upon this interpretation of the clergy person plays through the situation as it
begins to unfold.”).
214
8 Wigmore, supra note 42, §§ 2285, 2396; see also supra Part I and accompanying
notes (detailing this and other justifications for the clergy privilege).
215
While some jurisdictions provide carve-outs for child abuse reporting, all other spiritual
communications remain protected by the letter of the law. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 516:35 (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.2 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2505 (2010); 9 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 9-17-23 (2012); Tex. R. Evid. 505; W. Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-9 (LexisNexis
2012).
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teacher, worship leader, officiant at specialized ritual functions, friend,
and professional colleague, among others.216

Confidentiality is but one of clergy’s many responsibilities.217 Clergy
also shoulder secular and nonsecular obligations to protect their
congregations,218 aid the search for justice,219 and help victims.220
These competing duties can outweigh a cleric’s hypothetical interest
in confidentiality. In State v. Hancock,221 for example, a pastor testified
about communications with the defendant in a murder case.222 As part of
ongoing pastoral counseling, the defendant told the pastor details about
his wife’s recent disappearance and the defendant’s role in that

216
Rankin, supra note 213, at 8–9; see also Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note 10, at 21
(“To the religious community, [clergy] are administrators and advisers, preachers and public
figures, counselors and teachers. To the local community, they are fellow citizens and
consumers, friends and neighbors, parents and spouses. Functioning in these widely differing
roles, clergy interact with parishioners and nonparishioners alike in a whole host of religious
and non-religious communications.”); Video: Faith & Community: The Public Role of
Clergy (Polis Ctr. at Ind. Univ. 2003) (“[T]he public roles of clergy can include leader of
worship at a public event, caregiving during time of crisis, advocate for social issues,
interpreter of tradition for a wider audience, education for faith and ministry, public care,
and pastoral care and counseling.”).
217
See, e.g., Mark Herman, The Liability of Clergy for the Acts of Their Congregants, 98
Geo. L.J. 153, 167 (2009) (detailing clergy’s various duties).
218
See, e.g., Eileen Schmitz, Staying in Bounds: Straight Talk on Boundaries for Effective
Ministry 175 (2010) (“It is the responsibility of the pastor, as shepherd of the congregation,
to insure the health and safety of her sheep.”).
219
See, e.g., Azizah al-Hibri, The Muslim Perspective on the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 29
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1723, 1730 (1996) (discussing how Muslims are obligated to “advance
justice in society and to serve the societal maslaha”).
220
See, e.g., Marie M. Fortune, Confidentiality and Mandatory Reporting: A Clergy
Dilemma?, Faith Tr. Inst. 1, 3–4 (2014), http://www.faithtrustinstitute.org/resources/articles/
Confidentiality-and-Mandatory-Reporting2014.pdf (“The other ethical principle which
applies here is that of justice-making in response to harm done by one person to another.
Christian scripture here is very specific: ‘Be on your guard! If another disciple sins, you
must rebuke the offender, and if there is repentance, you must forgive.’ (Luke 17.3 NRSV)
The one who sins and who harms another must be confronted so that he might seek
repentance. Both Hebrew and Christian scriptures are clear that repentance has to do with
change: ‘ . . . get yourselves a new heart and a new spirit! . . . Turn, then, and live.’ (Ezekiel
18.31-32 NRSV). The Greek word used for repentance is metanoia, ‘to have another
mind.’”(alteration in original)).
221
No. M2012-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12,
2014), appeal denied (May 14, 2015).
222
Id. at *2.
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disappearance.223 In deciding to testify, the pastor focused on his
responsibility to help the victim, stating, “I felt that was my paramount
duty, not just as a citizen, but even as a pastor was to find the location
[of the victim].”224 Adopting this prioritizing of duties, the court denied
the privilege.225
Particularly in criminal cases, a cleric’s duty of confidentiality
competes with a concurrent duty to aid the search of justice.226 Shielding
a confession reduces the likelihood the defendant will face the
consequences of his wrongdoing. As one religious scholar states:
“Confidentiality was never intended to be merely keeping of secrets.
Nor was it ever intended to protect offenders from the consequences of
their behaviors. Clergy who interpret confidentiality in this way are
enabling the offender to continue offending.”227 Cases reflect this
concern, as People v. Johnson illustrates.228 The case involved a
confession of murder to Muslim brothers.229 The appellate court of New
York recognized that such communications could be privileged.230
Nonetheless, at trial, the brothers testified, overlooking potential
confidentiality issues based on “fear that defendant might be dangerous,
and their desire to get him out of the mosque.”231
Clergy traverse a fine line in prioritizing their varied duties. A cleric
who maintains confidences in cases of violent crimes and sexual abuse
risks harm to the very relationship the privilege is intended to foster.232

223
Id. at *5 (discussing how this counseling focused on defendant’s relationship “[w]ith
the Lord and with his wife”).
224
Id.
225
Id. at *6.
226
Cf. Gerald J. Margolis, The Psychology of Keeping Secrets, 1 Int’l Rev. PsychoAnalysis 291, 291 (1974) (“The more dangerous a secret, the greater the desire to give it
away, and at the same time the greater the fears of its revelation.”).
227
Marie M. Fortune, Violence in the Family 208 (1991).
228
115 A.D.2d 973, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. Some clergy similarly prioritize protecting the congregation in child abuse cases.
See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-09-00939-CR, 2010 WL 4484350, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov.
10, 2010) (breaching defendant’s confidences out of concern for other children in the
church).
232
See Alberta Mazat, Abuse: Confidentiality, Reporting, and the Pastor’s Role, Ministry
(Nov. 1995), https://www.ministrymagazine.org/archive/1995/11/abuse-confidentialityreporting-and-the-pastors-role [https://perma.cc/PFH6-6NCL] (“When confidentiality
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This perspective clarifies clergy’s willingness to cast confessions as
“confrontations” or “investigations”233 or even serve as informants.234
Doing so moves such communications outside the duty of
confidentiality and into the realm of the competing duty to protect.235 In
contrast, hiding behind the privilege risks the congregation viewing the
cleric as part of the wrongdoing.236 Yet, sharing such confidences may
similarly fuel discontent. Speaking out may draw the ire of congregants
who may not recognize the competing duties implicated.237 Such
conflicting pressures may push clergy to make case-specific decisions
regarding whether to testify.238

becomes the means of keeping in bondage even for one more day a person undergoing
harmful and illegal exploitation, it is no longer serving its purpose.”).
233
See, e.g., State v. McCurdy, 823 N.W.2d 418, 418 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012)
(investigation); Gutierrez, 2010 WL 4484350, at *1 (confrontation).
234
State v. Jackson, No. M2000-00763-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 812254, at *7 (Tenn.
Crim. App. July 18, 2001).
235
Cf. Rankin, supra note 213, at 10 (“Sometimes the pastor ‘reframes’ a situation based
on his or her interpretation of what is actually needed.”).
236
See, e.g., Rebecca Edmiston-Lange, Boundaries and Confidentiality, in The Safe
Congregation Handbook: Nurturing Healthy Boundaries in Our Faith Communities 28, 28
(Patricia Hoertdoerfer & Fredric Muir eds., 2005) (discussing how “destructive [the] cloak of
secrecy can be”); Marci A. Hamilton, Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What Is
Next, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 421, 436 (2012) (discussing how shielding communications
allows a “perpetrator [to] find the next victim in the very same institution and . . . assume
that the cloak of anonymity will cover his or her misdeeds”).
237
For a discussion of these competing tensions in the context of clergy communications
and elder abuse, see Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note 10, at 5 (“Clergy who report elder
abuse face risks including disclosure and hostility, the accusation of causing ‘unfair charges,’
loss of trust and credibility, and breach of religious discipline. Those who do not report also
face risks such as criminal penalties and civil damages; indeed, the religious institution itself
could be liable through vicarious liability.”).
238
Some religious scholarship actively encourages clergy to engage in this moral
weighing. See, e.g., Ronald K. Bullis & Cynthia S. Mazur, Legal Issues and Religious
Counseling 111–14 (1993) (providing guidelines for religious counselors, broken down
between considerations for “the religious counselor [that] wants to break a confidence” and
“the religious counselor [who] wants to remain silent”); D. Elizabeth Audette,
Confidentiality in the Church: What the Pastor Knows and Tells, Christian Century (Jan. 28,
1998), http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=317 (arguing confidentiality
turns on how the cleric “perceives the ministerial role at a given time in a given encounter”
so it is up to the pastor to “determine the limits of his or her confidentiality”); Rebecca
Edmiston-Lange,
Boundaries
and
Confidentiality
(Unitarian
Universalist),
http://www.uua.org/safe/handbook/leadership/165736.shtml [https://perma.cc/SZR5-949N]
(“[I]f a rigorous moral justification to override a confidence exists, they should not feel they
have betrayed another by divulging the information.”).
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Clergy have bemoaned the need for greater guidance in reconciling
confidentiality and competing ethical duties.239 Other professionals, such
as attorneys and psychotherapists, have the benefit of nuanced canons of
professional conduct to guide them.240 Clergy lack similar professional
canons of ethics241 or governing ethics committees.242 Similarly,
educational training on how to deal with crises is often inadequate,243
despite the reality that clergy are frequently “first responders.”244

239

See, e.g., Audette, supra note 55; Rankin, supra note 213, at 130–31.
Unlike other professionals, clergy are unlikely to face potential malpractice actions for
breaching confidentiality. Currently, no state recognizes a cause of action for clergy
malpractice. Only Ohio permits a potential negligence claim for violating the clergy
privilege. Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (permitting
negligence claim against clergy for alleged disclosure of confidential information that
parishioner had affair). But see Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988)
(rejecting tort of clergy malpractice on the facts of the case). Rather than permitting a cause
of action, Tennessee courts can impose a fine for breach of spiritual communications. See,
e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-206 (2000) (stating violation of the clergy privilege statutes is
a Class C misdemeanor). Some may view malpractice liability as a way to clarify disclosure
requirements. However, it is unclear that courts would necessarily use such claims for such
an undertaking. See, e.g., Alexander, 705 N.E.2d at 381 (permitting negligence claim
without delineating between protected and nonprotected communications).
241
Rankin, supra note 213, at 131; see also Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1032
(N.Y. 2001) (explaining clergy “are not subject to State-dictated educational prerequisites
and, significantly, no comprehensive statutory scheme regulates the clergy-congregant
spiritual counseling relationship”); Richard M. Gula, Ethics in Pastoral Ministry 3 (1996)
(discussing limited ethical foundations for clergy duty of confidentiality); Cassidy, supra
note 5, at 1684 (“[T]here are no universal standards of ethics that govern clergy conduct.”).
242
See, e.g., Am. Psychological Ass’n, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct (1992) (psychotherapists); Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 1.6 (2015) (attorneys); cf. Rankin, supra note 213, at 131 (“Lawyers, physicians, and
hospitals, after all have professional standards review bodies and ethics committees of one
sort or another. Why not have the same for clergy and the church? The absence of clear
ethical codes argues for some ongoing resource of this sort.”).
243
Bullis & Mazur, supra note 238, at 34 (“A nonrandom sample of theological schools
indicates that few courses are offered to prepare religious counselors for the variety of
clinical situations that may lead to lawsuits. Thus, clergy are increasingly faced with legal
issues that previous generations of clergy have not had to address.”); Wanda Lott Collins &
Sharon E. Moore, Theological and Practice Issues Regarding Domestic Violence: How Can
the Black Church Help Victims, 33 Soc. Work & Christianity 252, 258 (2006) (“[M]ost
pastors’ seminary training does not include crisis counseling that focuses on dangerous,
threatening, or violent behavior.”); Nancy Nason-Clark, Making the Sacred Safe: Woman
Abuse and Communities of Faith, 61 Soc. Religion 349, 359–65 (2000).
244
U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, When I Call for Help: A Pastoral Response to
Domestic Violence Against Women (2002), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/
marriage-and-family/marriage/domestic-violence/when-i-call-for-help.cfm.
240

COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2017]

Exorcising the Clergy Privilege

1065

This absence leaves clergy to search out guidance wherever
available—even if that means the annals of the Internet. Take, for
example, a recent blog post by a pastor. After he gave a sermon at an
out-of-state summer camp, a man approached the Protestant cleric,
confessing to the murder of a man who raped his girlfriend. Faced with
this information, the cleric sought guidance online because he is of “a
Protestant, non-demoniational [sic] church. We do not consideral [sic]
confession a sacrament, as a Catholic would, so there are no particular
clerical obligations to uphold. Our polity [sic] is complete congregation
autonomy: there is no supervising bishop or denomination headquarters
to consult.”245 Instead, the minister was forced to rely on online
responses for guidance—and the responses highlight how individualized
decision making is for clergy.246 While some encouraged the pastor to
divulge the information, others adamantly contended he was obliged to
keep the confidence.
Some individual denominations have responded to this request for
guidance. Unfortunately, these responses have trended towards the
generic.247 For example, the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
adopted a proposed code of ethics that merely instructs that ministers:

245
See Ask MetaFilter, How Does a Protestant Minister Handle a Confession of Murder?
(Oct. 20, 2006 4:29 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/48795/How-does-a-Protestant-ministerhandle-a-confession-of-murder [https://perma.cc/VQ2G-8CGL].
246
Id. (detailing the various, inconsistent responses on whether minister is morally
obligated to report a murder to the police).
247
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals, Code of Ethics for Congregations and Their
Leadership Teams (Sept. 2015), http://nae.net/code-of-ethics-for-congregations/ [https://
perma.cc/7ZTH-FC64] (discussing the need for transparency and dealing “fairly and openly
with causes of scandal” without providing confidentiality guidelines); Univ. Presbyterian
Church, Code of Conduct for Clergy, Church Staff and Volunteers (Feb. 26, 2008),
www.upc.org/download_file/view/473/ [https://perma.cc/TF8U-U2UC] (instructing church
personnel to “maintain confidentiality” without further guidance). Others are more helpful,
though, and clarify a cleric’s obligation to protect confidentiality, guiding clerics to discuss
issues of confidentiality at the outset of a communication and forgoing confidentiality when
the client discusses intent to harm himself or others. Archdiocese of St. Louis, Code of
Ethical Conduct for Clergy, Employees and Volunteers Working with Minors § 3
http://archstl.org/sep/page/policies-information-and-resources-code-ethical-conduct-1
[https://perma.cc/TA2E-DLU8] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
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“protect[] confidences; covenanting to only tell those who need to know,
what they need to know, when they need to know it.”248
Canonical tenets are equally imprecise. Judaism and most Protestant
religions have no explicit canonical or doctrinal obligation to maintain
confidences.249 At the other extreme is Catholicism, where
confidentiality absolutism is at its most extreme, with canonical law
stating, “it is absolutely wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the
penitent, for any reason whatsoever.”250 For religions between these
extremes, any institutional treatment only minimally assists clergy in
evaluating their competing duties.251 For example, the United Methodist
Book of Discipline states: “Ministers . . . are charged to maintain all
confidences
inviolate,
including
confessional
confidences,
except . . . where mandatory reporting is required . . . .”252
Thus, religious institutions share responsibility for the decline in the
privilege.253 Nonspecific mandates to maintain confidentiality ignore the
ongoing internal debate clergy experience when called as witnesses.
Without leadership, clergy chart their own paths between silence and
disclosure.254
248
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), My Ministerial Code of Ethics (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://disciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ministerial_Code_of_Ethics-english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EB5-A5M5].
249
See Goldfarb, supra note 138, at 138; William Harold Tiemann, The Right to Silence:
Privileged Communication and the Pastor 22 (1964).
250
Catholic Code of Canon Law c.983, § 1 (2003).
251
See, e.g., David Neff, Why the NAE Issued a Clergy Code of Ethics, Christianity Today (June
13, 2012), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/juneweb-only/nae-clergy-ethics-code.
html (“Denominations have produced a few things, but most haven’t. The few existing
statements tend to be truncated in scope or overly legalistic and rule specific.”).
252
Marvin W. Cropsey, The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church ¶ 341.5
(2012).
253
Some denominations have promulgated codes of ethics for pastoral counseling. These
too, though, are less than exacting. See, e.g., Ethics Statement of the Christian Association
for Psychological Studies (Apr. 7, 2005), http://caps.net/about-us/statement-of-ethicalguidelines [https://perma.cc/KAR6-KYG2] (instructing CAPS members to “maintain the
confidentiality of information that is provided to them in a professional setting, consistent
with the limits of applicable laws and regulations”).
254
Sissela Bok’s work on secrecy and confidentiality supports this understanding of clergy
behavior. Sissela Bok, The Limits of Confidentiality, The Hastings Center Report 24, 31
(Feb. 1983). (“The premises supporting confidentiality are strong, but they cannot support
practices of secrecy—whether by individual clients, institutions, or professionals—that
undermine and contradict the very respect for persons and for human bonds that
confidentiality was meant to protect.”).
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Admittedly, no single answer explains clergy’s willingness to testify.
Legislators continue to expand clergy privilege statutes without
clarifying the triggering requirements for the privilege. Courts fill these
gaps by turning to clergy testimony about religious doctrine. In
providing this testimony, though, clergy must balance competing duties
with insufficient legal or secular guidance on when to speak and when to
stay silent. Consequently, the decline of the privilege—and clergy’s role
in that decline—is the result of this mutable blend.
IV. QUALIFYING THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE
Through their interpretation of statutory requirements, clergy have
created an opening to reevaluate the necessity of an absolute clergy
privilege. The general thrust of the traditional justification for the
privilege is still apt: the clergy privilege exists to protect religious
relationships between communicants and clergy. Yet, the conclusion that
this relationship must always be sedulously fostered or that
confidentiality is essential to that relationship is unsupported conjecture.
Given this reality, as informed by the empirical analysis undertaken
earlier in this Article, this Part argues in favor of codifying a qualified
clergy privilege.255
As discussed in Part I, privileges are grouped into two distinct
categories: absolute—meaning the privilege does or does not apply—or
qualified—meaning courts decide the privilege through a case-specific,
need-based balancing test.256 Such binary categories ignore that
sometimes a party other than the court engages in a case-specific

255
As an initial clarification, the proffered solution is not for the clergy to own the
privilege outright. Consequently, this proposal stands in contrast to Professor Colombo’s
proposal for a specific clergy testimonial privilege. See Colombo, supra note 13, at 248–51.
Shifting ownership invites clergy to assert the privilege even when the communicant is
willing to testify—thus potentially increasing the privilege’s application at an unacceptable
cost to justice. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for
Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 228–29 (1966) (truthfinding capability of rules of evidence is fundamental concern of rules’ drafters).
256
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions
Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on SelfDisclosure, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 707, 726 (2004) (discussing how a rejection of Wigmorean
absolutist assumptions behind privileges “would probably lead to the reclassification of most
privileges as qualified or conditional”).
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balancing test. Currently, clergy undertake this balancing, making moral
decisions that shape and narrow the “real” scope of the privilege.
Adopting a qualified privilege shifts responsibility back to the
judiciary. Rather than wholesale acceptance of clergy’s labeling, courts
would engage in case-specific weighing. Fortunately, this Article’s
research provides a foundation for this shift. Courts and legislators can
integrate the lessons learned from existing jurisprudence. Clergy’s
testimony and conduct have generated multi-factor tests to balance the
privilege against the need for evidence in a given case. For example,
courts could consider the type of case at issue. Cases involving violent
crimes, potential future danger to others, or abuse could require a greater
showing that the communication needs shielding on religious grounds.
Similarly, to decide whether a cleric acted in his professional capacity, a
court could consider the location of the meeting, the duration of the
relationship between the communicant and clergy, and a preexisting
spiritual counseling relationship to decide an asserted privilege.257
At its core, this proposed solution pushes legal realism over legal
formalism.258 A qualified privilege would remedy illusory statutory
protection. As the case law establishes, existing clergy privilege statutes
promise a degree of protection that—if applied literally—would shield
far more testimony than actually occurs. A qualified privilege moves
clergy privilege statutes towards protection aligned with prevailing
interpretations.
As this Part explains, the argument here is not solely to unify law and
application. For many statutes, application is detached from law, despite
the fairness259 and transparency260 gains afforded by unity.261 Rather, a
257

See supra Figure 7 (setting out confidentiality factors).
Robert A. Shiner, Legal Realism, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 425
(Robert Audi ed., 1995).
259
See, e.g., Stuart F. Schaffer, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict
Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 Duke L.J. 824, 847 (1981) (discussing
how gaps in law and application can “erod[e] public confidence in the fairness of the
legal system”).
260
See Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment,
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 133, 239 (2004) (“A
system characterized by a gap between law and practice is a system that lacks
transparency.”).
261
As Roscoe Pound long ago noted, “the law upon the statute books will be far from
representing what takes place actually.” Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44
Am. L. Rev. 12, 34 (1910); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The
258
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qualified approach unifies the clergy privilege with liberal evidentiary
rules. Further, this solution best straddles the need for relevant evidence
in the truth-finding endeavor with the concurrent need to respect
religious relationships.
A. Aligning Policy and the Clergy Privilege
Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence to liberalize the
admissibility of evidence.262 The rules begin with a controlling missive:
evidence is admissible unless there is some special reason to exclude it.
From broadening the definition of competent witnesses to expanding
evidence an expert can rely on,263 evidentiary restrictions have lessened.
State evidentiary rules unsurprisingly reflect this trend; the majority of
states refashioned their laws to model the federal approach.264 Further,
particularly for privileges, these rules are to be dynamic. The Supreme
Court has reiterated the need for “evolutionary development” of
testimony privileges—urging reconsideration of privileges when
“experience suggest[s] the need for change.”265
Yet, as detailed in Part II, the clergy privilege is an anomaly against
this backdrop.266 Qualifying the clergy privilege is a step closer to

Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 439 n.9 (1930) (differentiating “paper” rules from “real”
ones). Generally, such disconnect occurs with restrictive laws, meaning those that prohibit
certain behavior—such as speed limits or littering laws—where the potential compliance
gains of the law justify the disconnect. See Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 101 Va. L.
Rev. 2185, 2185–88 (2015) (discussing the disconnect between law and application and the
rationale for the disconnect). The clergy privilege presents an inverse scenario: rather than a
limit on activity, the privilege promises a scope of protection that would not exist but for the
privilege, and in fact does not actually exist in application.
262
Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 69, 79 (2001)
(“[A]t least since the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there has been a strong drift
towards admissibility in the law of evidence . . . .”).
263
See, e.g., Jeffrey Cole, The Federal Hearsay Rule: You Can’t Believe Everything You
Hear, Litigation, Spring 2008, at 51, 56 (detailing these expansions).
264
See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & Pol’y
553, 553 (2007) (discussing how state evidentiary law has liberalized because most states
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which themselves embodied a more generous view
towards admissibility); Mark Hansen, Believe It or Not, 79 A.B.A. J. 64, 67 (1993)
(discussing how state and federal courts alike have liberalized evidentiary standards).
265
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47–48 (1980).
266
See Imwinkelreid, supra note 256, at 726 (“In the past few decades, there has been an
incipient trend to treat privileges as qualified rather than absolute.”).
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unifying evidentiary rules towards liberalizing admissibility. It also
finally integrates judicial experience with the privilege.
This approach would also limit the shielding of often highly probative
testimony without unnecessarily compromising the key policy
considerations underlying the privilege. In this way, such a revision
protects judicial truth finding by ensuring the clergy privilege does not
expand beyond its policy aims. Taken in turn, a qualified privilege limits
the privilege while respecting the policy considerations underlying the
traditional and autonomy rationales detailed in Part I.
First, a qualified privilege still promotes the traditional justification of
protecting
religious
relationships.
Protecting
all
spiritual
communications can compromise—rather than advance—spiritual
relationships more generally. A qualified approach more expansively
protects “religious relationships.” A qualified privilege allows courts to
assess whether, in a given case, the privilege promotes or compromises
the “prestigious place in society” that religion holds. To the extent the
privilege exists because of a desire to promote spiritual relationships, a
qualified privilege best tempers the potential harm from too broad a
privilege. It provides a mechanism to weigh a cleric’s competing duties
to other members of his congregation and thus to protect not just the
spiritual relationship between the particular communicant and clergy but
the relationships with other potential communicants as well.
Similarly, a qualified privilege considers both parties to the religious
relationship. Absolute statutes currently on the book disproportionately
emphasize the communicant. These statutes, if applied literally, protect
at cost to a cleric who might want to testify. Arguably, even a
comforting pat on the back from a cleric during a conversation could
convert it into a privileged discussion. Rather than focusing solely on
communicants’ desires to confide, a qualified privilege also takes into
account a cleric’s desire to disclose. Courts can weigh these views,
along with other factors relevant to the case, in making a privilege
determination.
A qualified privilege also advances the traditional justification by
encouraging spiritual communications. Communicants decide to talk
based on more than legal considerations. As Professor Leo observed,
after hearing Miranda warnings, detained individuals still talk roughly
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seventy-five percent of the time.267 Even more on point, though, is the
absence of any chilling effect under the current arrangement, whereby
clergy rather than courts are engaging in this weighing. In fact,
communicants already confide to clergy who explicitly state their
intention to share the information. Behavioral science research shows
motivation for self-disclosure is too multifaceted and individualized to
causally link to any single variable.268 The privilege does not need to be
absolute.269
A qualified approach could also incentivize religious institutions to
articulate concrete tenets regarding spiritual communications for clerical
and judicial consideration. Tailored rather than generic tenets have the
potential to advance confidence in religion by conceding not all
communications are confidential. This, in turn, encourages religious
relationships and advances the traditional justification far more than
clergy-by-clergy decision making.270
Second, a qualified privilege does not compromise autonomy.
Communicants can still rely on religious consultations and beliefs when
making decisions. As cases evidence, even with the rate of successful
privilege assertions dropping, clergy remain a primary source of advice
and guidance on everything from legal guidance to marital problems.271
A qualified privilege does not compromise this consulting function, seen
as essential to an autonomy-based rationale. A qualified privilege may
even enhance communicant autonomy.272 Currently, a communicant
could rely on statutory language and incorrectly assume a
267
See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
621, 653 (1996).
268
See Imwinkelried, supra note 256, at 713–14 (debunking the link between law and selfdisclosure using behavioral science research).
269
This requisite involvement of religious institutions is realistic, since, as detailed in
Section III.B, canonical confidentiality requirements are evolving.
270
Thus, this solution is tripartite. State legislatures would need to enact statutory language
to recognize the existing qualified nature of the privilege. The judiciary then would adopt
relevant factors. Finally, religious institutions would articulate guidelines that courts could
consider about a particular religion.
271
See, e.g., People v. Police, 651 P.2d 430, 430 (Colo. App. 1982) (legal advice); People
v. Peterson, 47 N.E.3d 1005, 1052 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), reh’g denied (Dec. 16, 2015), appeal
allowed, 48 N.E.3d 1095 (Ill. 2016) (marital counseling).
272
See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 155 (1986) (discussing how the exercise of
autonomy intelligently as a rational actor requires informed choice); accord Joseph Raz,
Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, in 7 Midwest Studies in
Philosophy: Social and Political Philosophy 89, 112 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1982).
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communication is privileged. A qualified privilege would help
communicants understand the potential legal consequences of seeking
religious guidance. These are not new consequences. Rather, the current
absolute appearance of the privilege masks these risks. In contrast, a
codified qualified privilege is more transparent about potential judicial
disclosures.273
A qualified privilege also brings more balance to autonomy concerns.
An absolute privilege spotlights a communicant’s right to autonomy.
This narrow focus compromises clergy’s freedom of choice in
responding to the divulgences. In revealing a confidence, the speaker has
divested a portion of that secret to another.274 He foregoes some of his
autonomy by involving the listener. Consequently, in sharing a secret,
the communicant has triggered consideration of the cleric’s autonomy,
and with it concordant consideration of the cleric’s duties and
obligations.275 A qualified privilege provides an opening currently
missing for judicial consideration of these duties.
Third, a qualified privilege also sufficiently responds to the
democratic rationale. Clergy’s testimony and the declining rate of
successful privilege assertions minimize this rationale. A court rarely
faces the “offensive” scenario of compelling clergy to testify.276
However, the current dynamic creates an opposing offensive scenario:
an absolute privilege can force a cleric to maintain a confidence he does
not want to keep. A qualified privilege moderates both problematic
scenarios. A clergy’s view is relevant but not an outcome-determinative
factor in deciding the privilege. Hence, a qualified privilege reflects
legal realities while still minimizing “the unpleasant prospect of
imprisoning clergy for contempt of court.”277
273
Further, a qualified privilege also remedies inconsistency between various autonomybased privileges. See, e.g., Beerworth, supra note 94, at 100 (discussing the existing
disconnect between the attorney-client privilege and the clergy privilege).
274
Cf. Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 24 (1982)
(“[T]he claim to own secrets about oneself is often far-fetched.”).
275
See Charles Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death x (2009) (discussing how
individual autonomy must give ground to competing ethical duties). These duties drove
Jeremy Bentham, a rabid opponent of privileges, to conclude that the clergy’s claim to the
privilege exceeds the communicant’s. Bentham, supra note 42, at 588.
276
In rare situations where a clergy member is in contempt, courts usually impose little to
no penalty for not testifying. See, e.g., People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 322 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004) (discussing issuance of contempt order only to allow appeal, not to punish).
277
Imwinkelried, New Wigmore, supra note 4, § 5.4.4.a., at 420 n.138.
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Combined, this proposed solution returns responsibility to the
legislature, the judiciary, and religious institutions and off the shoulders
of clergy. State legislatures would need to recognize the existing
qualified nature of the privilege and enact statutory language to codify
this reality.278 The judiciary would then finally develop factors to
consider for such a balancing test. Finally, religious institutions would
articulate guidelines for courts to consider—but not necessarily mirror—
as part of that multifactor analysis. This approach, thus, respects the
rationale for the privilege while remediating the trifold abdication that
shifted decision-making responsibility onto clergy.
B. A Qualified Privilege Is the Most Tailored Solution
Any proposed solution triggers questions about whether one solution
is preferable to another. Admittedly, this Article’s solution is no
different. A qualified privilege precludes ex ante guarantees of
protection. Currently, though, such protection is equally uncertain.
Though it is not without its downsides, a qualified privilege is less
problematic than other alternative revisions.
The more skeptical may urge eviscerating the privilege altogether. If
the trend in evidentiary rules is liberalized admissibility, surely
removing the clergy privilege altogether best achieves that goal.
However, such an argument goes too far. Further, scholars have made
strong First Amendment arguments, which are beyond the scope of this
argument, for some clergy privilege.279 Eliminating the clergy privilege
altogether would also mean that policy justifications, such as autonomy,
matter more for conversations with psychotherapists or attorneys than
with clergy. Such an extreme approach unnecessarily challenges public

278
Once state legislators take this step, it paves a path for federal courts to follow in suit.
See Peter Nicolas, “They Say He’s Gay”: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual
Orientation, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 793, 869 (2003) (“One factor to which the federal courts look in
deciding whether to recognize a new privilege, or to alter the parameters of an existing one,
are the trends in the states.”).
279
Courts have yet to hold the First Amendment requires a clergy privilege. Nonetheless,
scholars have convincingly argued this point. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 1, at 514.
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support for the privilege,280 ignoring how deeply etched the clergy
privilege is in the American psyche.281
The better question, perhaps, is why not articulate a series of
exceptions or presumptions. Codified exceptions could provide a greater
degree of predictability than a qualified privilege. For example, potential
exceptions could include removing threats or communications about
abuse from the categories of protected communications. Alternatively,
why not identify different standards for different cause of action, like the
spousal privileges do?
Such incremental proposals forgo the lessons from clergy privilege
jurisprudence. Consequently, they inaccurately identify cases where
clergy willingly testify. For example, courts and clergy alike are reticent
to privilege clergy communications in criminal cases.282 This might
suggest excluding criminal cases.283 Some privileges already only apply
either in civil or criminal cases, but not both.284 In fact, some courts have
inched towards this approach by recognizing a cleric’s duty to warn and

280
See id. at 504 (“The fact that all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted
statutes ensuring the place of the clergy-penitent privilege demonstrates public approval of
the privilege.”).
281
Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1630 (“The clergy-penitent privilege is deeply engrained in
American culture.”). Movies, television shows, and books all reinforce society’s
expectations for some form of the clergy privilege. See, e.g., I Confess (Warner Brothers
1953); Law and Order: The Collar (Season 12, Episode 11). Popular culture does not dictate
the parameters of justice, but it does influence how radically to alter law. More
fundamentally, though, the privilege remains a vital part of the tenuous contract between
church and state. Thus, a lesser course than elimination is necessary.
282
See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 724 So.2d 557, 562 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998);
Commonwealth. v. Nutter, 28 N.E.3d 1, 4–5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), review denied, 35
N.E.3d 721.
283
Accord Goldfarb, supra note 138, at 143 (discussing how refusal to testify “may be
appropriate, even socially acceptable, in civil cases . . . but it should not be tolerated when
ongoing criminal actions are involved or gross miscarriages of justice are perpetrated as a
result”).
284
See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, 1 Handbook of Federal Evidence § 505.1 at 715 (5th ed.
2001) (explaining how in federal court, the martial testimony privilege applies only to
criminal cases); accord Thomas A. Mauet & Warren D. Wolfson, Trial Evidence § 8.10 at
259 (1997); 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 206 at 426
(2d ed. 1994); 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 129, § 505.04 at 505–07. But see Katherine
O. Eldred, “Every Spouse’s Evidence”: Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial
Privilege in Federal Civil Trials, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1319, 1346 (2002) (arguing it is unclear
whether the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases).
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to protect his congregation as reasons to waive the confidentiality.285
However, simply carving out criminal cases creates an arbitrary
boundary. Such cases involve undoubtedly privileged communications,
such as sacramental Catholic confessions. At the same time, this option
excludes other instances where clergy decline to testify—such as
divorce proceedings. Thus, such an approach is both over and under
inclusive.286
Piecemeal exceptions also invite half-measures rather than
comprehensive change.287 Efforts to expand abuse reporting illustrate the
problem. Clergy are mandatory reporters in twenty-two states.288 In
seventeen additional states, any person who suspects child abuse or
neglect is required to report it.289 While some states deny the clergy
285

See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1673 (arguing clergy bear the same duty to warn as
psychotherapists and attorneys). But see Terry Wuester Milne, “Bless Me Father, for I Am
About to Sin . . .”: Should Clergy Counselors Have a Duty to Protect Third Parties?, 22
Tulsa L.J. 139, 147–65 (1986) (arguing against clergy obligation to protect third parties).
286
Privileging only confessions is also under inclusion. It risks protecting only Catholics,
without similar protection for religions where a penitent confesses directly to her god.
Hence, such a carve-out invites the potential for unnecessary religious entanglement by the
judiciary and related concerns regarding unnecessarily hampering religious liberty.
287
Similarly, affording clergy their own privilege or, at a minimum, shared ability to
waive the privilege is unworkable. This would make the privilege an aberration, as the
communicant owns almost all other privileges. See supra Part I. Further, allowing the clergy
to decide the privilege cases would lead to a two-tier privilege. Clergy may afford more
restrictive interpretations when they are witnesses rather than parties. Adopting a qualified
privilege minimizes such issues.
288
Ala. Code § 26-14-3 (2016); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620 (2010); Cal. Penal Code
§ 11165.7 (Deering 2008); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-304 (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101
(2015); 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4 (2016); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 603 (2014); Me. Stat.
tit. 22, § 4011-A (2016); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 51A (2016); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv.
§ 722.623 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2017); Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (2016); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 43-21-353 (2015 & Supp. 2016); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.115 (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 413-201 (2015); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-C:29 (2014); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-3 (2013);
N.D. Cent. Code § 50-25.1-03 (2007 & Supp. 2015); 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 6311 (West 2017); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-310 (2010 & Supp. 2016); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33,
§ 4913 (2014 & Supp. 2016); W. Va. Code § 49-2-803 (LexisNexis 2015); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 48.981 (2015–16).
289
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); Fla. Stat. § 39.201 (2016); Idaho Code § 16-1619
(2009 & Supp. 2017); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-33-5-1 (LexisNexis 2013); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 620.030 (LexisNexis 2014); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-705 (LexisNexis 2012); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-711 (2016); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202.882 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2013); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-301 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 10A, § 1-2101 (2011 & Supp. 2016); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.010(1) (2015); 40 R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-3
(2006 & Supp. 2016); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-403 (2014); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.101
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privilege in cases of child abuse or neglect,290 others allow the privilege
despite reporting obligations.291 Yet, at the same time, while potentially
self-serving, statements by religious institutions indicate more
willingness to disclose such communications.292 Many major religions in
the United States no longer shield otherwise confidential
communications of abuse, and some mandate reporting.293 Yet, despite
the changing landscape, efforts to exempt abuse disclosures from the
privilege remain at a standstill.
Thus, a series of exceptions would likely leave clergy responsible for
deciding whether to testify. After over a hundred years of statutory
privilege, legislatures are no closer to writing a statute that addresses the
(West 2014 & Supp. 2016); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-403 (LexisNexis 2011); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 14-3-205 (2017).
290
See Greenwald, 2 Testimonial Privileges § 6:14 (3d ed. 2015) (listing New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia as states that abrogate
the privilege altogether in cases of abuse).
291
See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-400, 19.2-271.3 (2015); cf. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 5.60.060(3) (2016) (where clergy are not mandatory reporters but their testimony is
provided statutory immunity from liability). Cf. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1142 (detailing
survey showing “in many states the clergy privilege trumps the obligation to report; in
others, a fewer number to be sure, the obligation to report trumps the privilege; and in a third
group, the question of the relationship is not answered in the statute”).
292
Take, for example, the Church of Latter Day Saints. For many years, the Church
handled child abuse allegations internally. Church officials investigated them. Only if the
Church found wrongdoing were these investigations shared outside the church. Recently, the
Church has adopted a “zero-tolerance policy,” whereby the church agrees to “cooperate with
law enforcement to report and investigate abuse.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, How the Church Approaches Abuse, Mormon Newsroom, http://www.mormon
newsroom.org/article/how-mormons-approach-abuse [https://perma.cc/89GC-MBM3] (last
visited Aug. 16, 2017).
293
Statements by the Georgia Baptist Convention, Southern Baptist Convention, and
Evangelical Lutheran Church of America evidence this shift. See, e.g., Ga. Baptist
Convention, What a Church Should Know About Reporting Suspected Child Abuse:
Georgia’s Mandatory Reporting Statute, https://gabaptist.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
07/reporting-suspected-child-abuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH83-JXSW] (last visited Aug. 16,
2017) (“[M]embers of the clergy should not avoid reporting suspected child abuse based on
this ‘confessional’ exception.”); Exec. Comm. of the Southern Baptist Convention,
Responding to the Evil of Sexual Abuse (June 2008), http://www.sbc.net/pdf/2008
ReportSBC.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLP8-G3CM] (“Any individual confessing to, or being
credibly accused of, sexual abuse should be reported immediately to the governing
authorities.”); Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., Report Misconduct,
https://www.elca.org/Our-Work/Leadership/Vocation-Become-a-Leader/Report-Misconduct
[https://perma.cc/HN4L-NAHK] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017) (“The ELCA encourages
immediately reporting to the civil authorities all instances of child abuse regardless of
personal confidentiality issues.”).
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current problems with the privilege. This historical failure suggests
identifying boundaries through a series of exemptions is unlikely. Rather
than continue to foist this burden on clergy, it is time for courts to
undertake this weighing more fully. Only a qualified privilege would
return this responsibility to courts while simultaneously upholding the
policy considerations underlying the privilege.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures and courts blindly assume that only an absolute clergy
privilege can resolve religious policy concerns. This Article confronts
this assumption. It uncovers how the language of the fifty states’ clergy
privilege statutes reflects none of clergy’s reticence to rely on the
privilege. This disconnect between what seems privileged versus what
actually is cries out for legislative reform.
That reform starts with an exorcism of the faulty premise underlying
an absolute privilege. Not all confidences need shielding to foster and
encourage spiritual relations. Nor does autonomy necessitate unqualified
confidentiality. Using clergy’s own construction of the privilege
provides a roadmap towards reconciling law and application. This map
gives legislators, scholars, and the judiciary a path towards long needed
balance between liberal admissibility rules and policy concerns shielding
communicant disclosures. Codifying a qualified privilege recognizes the
need for privileged communications while developing a conservative
construction that concurrently respects religion.
The longevity of the clergy privilege is a testament to America’s
steadfast commitment to religious freedom. The purpose of this Article
is not to undermine that commitment. Rather, it is to push against the
“empirical assumption” underlying the absolute nature of the privilege.
Neither clergy nor courts are willing to blindly privilege a wide swath of
spiritual communications. Thus, it is time to dispel the long-standing
myth preserving absolutist clergy privilege statutes. By clergy’s conduct,
the privilege has already shifted towards qualified protection. Now is the
time to recognize that shift.

